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ESSAYS ON SAVINGS, HOUSING, AND TAXATION
MANNI YU
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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on topics in macroeconomics.
Chapter One studies whether the rich save a larger fraction than other economic
groups. We use The Fiscal Analyzer, a detailed life-cycle consumption-smoothing pro-
gram, to calculate lifetime net resources, including private wealth, human wealth, and
net taxes. We identify a strong negative relationship between the average propensity
to consume and lifetime net resources. The average propensity to consume decreases
on each component of lifetime net resources except for liquid assets. The results
do not change if we consider heterogeneous borrowing constraints among households.
Results of models indicate that bequest motives could explain why the rich save more.
Chapter Two measures the work disincentives, including explicit taxes and implicit
loss of benefits, of the elderly. We use The Fiscal Analyzer to calculate remaining
lifetime marginal net tax rates. We find that Uncle Sam is inducing the elderly to
retire. The marginal net taxation of labor earnings is extremely high. A significant
increase in earnings leads to a higher marginal net tax rate than earning a small
extra amount of money. There is enormous dispersion in effective marginal remaining
lifetime net tax rates facing households with the same age and resource level. Current-
year marginal net tax rates can dramatically understate the work disincentives facing
the elderly.
Chapter Three explores the different implications of housing price and labor pro-
vii
ductivity on the skill ratio. I construct a spatial equilibrium model with two skill
types of households. When the housing supply increases in the more developed re-
gion, the skill ratio in both regions decreases and both types of labor get higher utility.
When the labor productivity of high-skilled labor in the more developed region in-
creases, the skill ratio increases in the more developed region and decreases in the
less developed region and only the high-skilled labor get higher utility.
viii
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The Rich Save More: Evidence from the
Health and Retirement Study
1.1 Introduction
In this paper, we ask the question of whether the rich save more than other economic
groups out of their remaining lifetime net resources. We define remaining lifetime net
resources (also referred to as net resources or resources) as the sum of private and
human wealth, deducting lifetime net taxes. The answer to this question is crucial
to important issues in economics and sociology. First, it has important implications
for intergenerational mobility because, if the rich do save more and leave a bequest
to their children, the next generation of the rich will have access to more resources,
making them more likely to maintain their social status and making intergenerational
mobility low. This may lead to such negative consequences as human wealth misal-
location and macroeconomic inefficiency. Second, since the distribution of wealth
is serially correlated, it becomes harder to reduce inequality. Third, the distribu-
tion of wealth can affect aggregate consumption and savings through heterogeneous
household behavior, influencing the growth of the economy.
Another motivation for our paper is that a number of popular and influential
models only generate constant consumption and saving rates. In these models, wealth
inequality is exclusively generated by wage inequality. However, empirical evidence
in the U.S. (see Straub (2018)) shows that wage inequality is not enough to gener-
ate wealth inequality. Straub (2018) showed that, in an Aiyagari (1994) model, the
consumption and saving rates are independent of changes in labor income shares.
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Thus, any redistribution of permanent incomes cannot affect consumption and saving
rates, indicating constant consumption and saving rates. Models with precautionary-
savings motives, in general, induced by different types of frictions, such as idiosyn-
cratic risk (see Aiyagari (1994)), liquidity constraints (see Carroll (1998)), and labor
income uncertainty (see Gourinchas and Parker (2002)), all generate a constant saving
rate. Although precautionary-savings models produce decreasing consumption rates
in current income, they generate constant consumption rates in permanent income.
Firm-side assumptions could also be flexible. Models with monopolistic competition
also have the constant saving rate feature, just as the perfect competition models do.
We start by checking the consumption rate generated by a standard macroeco-
nomic model. In the standard model, a representative agent works to earn a constant
stream of nontaxable wage incomes each period and saves in one asset, paying a
constant interest rate with no tax. We assume a CRRA utility function without
uncertainty or idiosyncratic shocks. Also, there is no heterogeneity in interest rate,
impatience factor, and risk tolerance. We define remaining lifetime resources to be
the sum of asset value and the present value of future earnings in the model. Then,
the consumption rate out of remaining lifetime resources is constant and the same
across all households. It is determined only by interest rate, impatience factor, and
risk tolerance and, not influenced by household remaining lifetime resources. So the
standard model could not generate a decreasing consumption rate. As we mentioned
before, even a wider range of models have constant consumption and saving rates
results.
Instead, we propose two models that could generate heterogeneous consumption
rates. One is a model with heterogeneous interest rates, impatience factors, and risk
tolerances. The other is a model with bequest motives where the bequest utility
function has a smaller coefficient of relative risk aversion than the utility function.
Other assumptions in the two models are the same as in the standard model. The
different implications of the two models are that, when there is an unexpected small
3
exogenous shock to resources, the consumption rate in the model with heterogeneity
would not change but would change in the model with bequest motives.
Next, we use the 2014 wave of Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the 2015
wave of Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS) for regression analysis. The
first step is to measure remaining lifetime net resources or household resources over
the life cycle, including all relevant items. The credibility of our study relies on such
precise measurement. Using HRS data and The Fiscal Analyzer (TFA), a detailed
life-cycle consumption-smoothing program that incorporates borrowing constraints,
we estimate each part of the remaining lifetime net resources.
The present value of private wealth is the sum of the market value of assets. To
measure human wealth, we use the earnings history of households, included in the
restricted HRS data, to forecast future earnings. We group households into different
cells in each wave by age, sex, and education, and use successive waves to estimate
annual earnings growth rates by age and year for individuals in each sex and education
cell. We project future earnings for each particular cell until age sixty-seven (when
we assume individuals claim retirement benefits) by using average historical growth
rates by age, net of average overall earnings growth plus an assumed future annual real
growth rate of one percent. Heterogeneity within cells is generated by a random walk
process of permanent component and a serially uncorrelated transitory component.
We calculate the present value of future earnings as human wealth. The discount
factors we use are capital returns, calculated cell by cell using a similar procedure.
The finely calculated future earnings and discount factors, based on earnings history
and referring to comparable peers, lead to more reliable results.
We calculate net taxes as taxes deducting transfers to household resources. It
is a big challenge to include all major federal and state tax and transfer programs
and most previous studies failed to do this. However, TFA includes information
about thirty tax and welfare programs, each containing the tax rate for every bracket
at state and federal level and specific eligibility and benefits for welfare programs,
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depending on the economic situation and demographics of individual households. We
have access to the restricted data of HRS that enables us to know the geographical
location of households, which is also crucial to calculating their exact net taxes.
Once we have the measure of resources, we can check the relationship between
consumption rates and resources. OLS regression suffers from the endogeneity issue
that consumption behavioral factors may be connected with the ability to accumulate
wealth. We calculate large return rates by changes in values of total assets as the
wealth luck instrument. Then, we use eight waves of the HRS and the CAMS data
from the year 2000 to 2014 to construct a panel data of household total private assets.
Abnormally large return rates causally increase resources and we assume households
receive large return rates because of pure luck. Our key result is that consumption
rates decrease in resources in the IV regression. The average propensity to consume
(APC) decreases significantly and economically from 0.09 for the bottom 20% re-
sources quintile to about 0.01 for the top 20% resources quintile. The difference is
about 3 standard deviations. By testable implications in the model part, we conclude
that bequest motives can explain why the rich save more. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test shows that there is a systematic difference in IV and OLS estimators. This is
not necessarily caused by heterogeneity. First, there may be measurement errors in
resources. Second, most reasonable cases of heterogeneity would predict a downward
OLS bias. Thus, heterogeneity plays little role in explaining why the rich save more.
Our conclusion is that, the rich save more and bequest motives can explain why.
Then we run some robustness checks. First, we constructed borrowing constraint
indicator by taking the inverse of the number of years before the first jump in con-
sumption. Our main results remain the same. We also break net resources into its
three main components: private wealth, human wealth, and net taxes, or further
breaking private wealth into liquid assets and illiquid assets. The consumption rate
is irresponsive to liquid assets and decreasing in all others.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the related
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literature. Section 1.3 describes three models and checks the model-generated con-
sumption rate. Section 1.4 introduces key definitions and the software TFA, sets up
the reduced form, and introduces the regression strategy. Section 1.5 summarizes the
data we use. Section 1.6 shows the OLS and IV regression results and some robustness
checks. Section 1.7 concludes with results and future plans.
1.2 Literature Review
Our paper relies on the theory of the saving rate and consumption function, and, more
specifically, on consumption as a function of lifetime resources. The pioneering work of
Friedman (1957) empirically tested the permanent income hypothesis (PIH), showing
that consumption is a linear function of permanent income. But there is no consensus
on the relationship between consumption and permanent income. Mayer (1966) and
Mayer (1972) showed that the marginal propensity to consume is not equal to average
propensity, thus requiring special hypotheses to reconcile with the permanent income
hypothesis (PIH) and leading the PIH to be invalid. The disagreement partly results
from measurement errors and data quality issues. Little research on these issues has
appeared after the upsurge in the 1950s and 1960s.
The relatively new work of Dynan et al. (2004) addressed the question do the rich
save more and showed a strong positive relationship between saving rates and current
income. The relationship still holds when income is instrumented by lagged or future
income or education. The biggest problem of their work is, although they have proxies
for permanent income (lifetime net resources in our paper), they did not measure it
directly. We seriously doubt the credibility of their results because of the measurement
errors and this is one of the reasons why the question is still debated. High current
income does not necessarily indicate high lifetime net resources. The four proxies
that Dynan et al. (2004) use can only partially resolve the issue because they are all
instruments on earnings and not on private wealth or net taxes, the measurement of
which are complicated and crucial. Therefore, their proxies for human wealth cannot
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explain earnings completely. In addition to education, ability is another important
determinant of labor earnings. Our methodology, comparatively, is much stronger
because it directly and accurately measures every component of lifetime net resources.
Straub (2018) estimated the elasticity of consumption to permanent income from
a simultaneous equations model, inspired by results from an overlapping generations
(OLG) model with endogenous bequest distribution. The estimated elasticity is about
0.7, so consumption is concave in permanent income. Straub (2018) successfully re-
duced measurement errors by computing permanent income as the symmetric average
over log residualized incomes from one of the simultaneous equations and proposing
two instrumental variables. But we think our paper pioneers the direct measurement
of lifetime net resource, a major contribution to this literature.
Kaplan and Violante (2014) showed large liquid assets holders have small propen-
sities to consume out of additional transitory income, and large illiquid assets holders
have small propensities to consume out of news about future income. The different
roles of liquid and illiquid assets intrigue us and, in order to study them separately,
we break private wealth in lifetime net resources into two components and check their
relationship with consumption separately.
Although the answer to the question of whether the rich save more is still debated,
some research has assumed yes is the answer and asked why. Carroll (1998) argued
that the rich save more because wealth is luxury goods or could generate a flow of
services such as power. Dynan et al. (2004) tested different models and found that
hyperbolic preferences and bequest motives could explain why the rich save more but
uncertainty could not.
Our paper is also broadly linked to consumption and saving studies of the elderly.
Hurd and Rohwedder (2003), Hurd and Rohwedder (2006) and Hurd and Rohwedder
(2008) resolved the retirement consumption puzzle using the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS) and the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS), the same
data sets we use. They found low-wealth households with poor health conditions are
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forced to retire early. The decline rate of consumption for this small group of people
is high, but the decline rate is small at the population level. Hurd and Rohwedder
(2013) investigated the age pattern of saving, also using the HRS and the CAMS.
They showed that singles dissave after age 65, and couples actively save to keep
wealth unchanged. Resolving the puzzle and investigating the pattern rely on their
knowledge of the data and we make use of it from their work.
1.3 Model Explanations
In this section, we build a canonical model in which we incorporate bequest motives
and heterogeneous parameters, such as impatience factor, risk tolerance, and assets
return. The model collapses into the following three types of models under certain
restrictions: a standard model, a model with bequest motives, and a model with
heterogeneous parameters. We explore the relationship between consumption rate
and lifetime resources in the models and compare them with the data.
Time is continuous, and there is no uncertainty or aggregate risk. Households earn
wage income w and save through one asset a. We assume a CRRA utility function with
coefficient of relative risk aversion σi. Households die with probability p at each age
for simplicity. The utility from bequeathing V B(a) is CRRA with a smaller coefficient






. Impatience factor ρi and
assets return ri are heterogeneous. Households Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is
presented as follows:




+ V ′(a)(ria+ w − c) + p(V B(a′)− V (a′)) (1.1)
We define the lifetime resources x in this model as the sum of physical wealth and
present value of wage earnings.
x = a+ w/ri (1.2)
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1.3.1 Standard Model
In the standard model without bequest motives and heterogeneity, where σBi = σi =







Combining the Euler equation and the dynamics of physical wealth, we can show that







One thing to notice is that the constant consumption and saving rate result in the
standard model above could be applied to wider contexts with discrete time, finite
horizon, other utility forms, uncertainty, or borrowing constraint.
1.3.2 Explanation One: A Model with Heterogeneous Parameters
With heterogeneous parameters and without bequest motives, i.e., σBi = σi, the model







The model with heterogeneous parameters provides an ex-ante explanation of why
the rich save more. For example, if the agent with large lifetime resources is born
to be more patient with a smaller ρi, the consumption rate would be smaller for this
agent. When there is unanticipated exogenous small shock to resources, households
consumption rates would not change in this economy.
1.3.3 Explanation Two: A Model with Bequest Motives
With bequest motives and without heterogeneous parameters, i.e., ρi = ρ, ri = r, and





= r − ȧ
x
(1.6)
where a is one solution of the differential equation,
ρV (a) =
[(1− p)V ′(a) + pa−σB ]σ−1σ −1
1− σ
+ [(1− p)V ′(a)
+ pa−σ
B




This model provides an ex-post explanation of why the rich save more. When
there is an unanticipated small exogenous positive shock to resources, consumption
rates would decrease for each household in this economy.
We notice that the testable implications of the above two models are different.
Suppose the null hypothesis is that there is no heterogeneity. We construct the
wealth luck instrumental variable as a proxy of resources shock to check which model
is true, implicated by data. We will discuss how to make use of the implications and
interpretations in the IV methodology section 1.4.5.
1.4 Methodology
In this section, we talk about our methodology in the empirical analysis, introducing
some key concepts and definitions and the software program we use to compute some
of the variables. Then, we formulate baseline regressions based on the reduced forms.
Finally, we discuss the need for instrument variables and the strategy.
1.4.1 Concepts and Definitions
We define the average propensity to consume (APC) out of remaining lifetime net
resources, in contrast to other studies that define the propensity to consume out
of current disposable income or wealth. We define remaining lifetime net resources
through two equations: (1) remaining lifetime net resources, R, is defined to be
remaining lifetime gross resources, RG, minus the present value of remaining lifetime
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net taxes (taxes paid less transfer payments received), T , as
R = RG − T (1.8)
and (2) remaining lifetime gross resources is composed of human wealth, H, and
private net wealth, W , as
RG = H +W (1.9)
where human wealth is the present value of lifetime earnings and private net wealth
is the market value of all assets.
1.4.2 The Fiscal Analyzer
We use The Fiscal Analyzer (TFA) to compute the remaining lifetime net resources
and all its components for each of the households in the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS). As described in Auerbach et al. (2019), TFA is a detailed life-cycle
consumption-smoothing program that incorporates borrowing constraints. TFA cal-
culates remaining lifetime net taxes and remaining lifetime spending, along all sur-
vival trajectories, and then converts them to present values. TFA includes all federal
and state income and sales tax provisions in effect as well as all federal and most
state-specific transfer programs.
The specific list of tax and transfer programs included in our calculations are
outlined in the Table 1.1.
TFA’s Consumption-Smoothing Dynamic Program
TFA’s lifetime consumption smoothing procedure begins with the reading of house-
hold demographic and economic data. The demographic data includes marital status,
birth dates of each spouse/partner, maximum ages of life of spouse/partners, birth
dates of children, and ages at which children will leave the household. The economic
data includes detailed measures of earnings and assets (for both the past and the
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future).1 TFA assumes inflation and rates of return on regular and retirement ac-
count assets, household debts, and current primary home data.2 Preferences about
the desired degree of consumption smoothing are also included (i.e., the preferred
age-living standard path).3 The degree and timing of future changes in Social Secu-
rity benefits, federal taxes, state taxes, and payroll taxes, are also incorporated into
the calculations.
TFA’s default assumption, which can be changed, is that the household seeks to
have the same living standard per household member through time. The program
obeys the specified desired standard of living profile to the extent possible without vi-
olating the household’s borrowing constraint. The program simultaneously calculates
not just the household’s smoothest living standard path, but also its time-varying
demands for life insurance (and, thus, the living insurance premiums it will pay each
year) and each of the above-referenced taxes and transfer payments.4
Imputing Past and Future Earnings Based on the Health and Retirement
Study
The restricted section of the Health and Retirement Study contains data on respon-
dents’ past earnings histories. We have access to this data and use it to calculate
1These include past Social Security covered labor earnings, current labor earnings and projected
future labor earnings, regular (non-retirement account) assets, 401(k) and other deductible retire-
ment account assets, Roth retirement assets, current and projected future contributions to each
type of retirement account, retirement-account withdrawal choices (start and end date, annuitiza-
tion and order of withdraws as between Roth and 401(k)-type accounts), Social Security benefit
collection choices, defined benefit pensions, and information on retirement income from non-Social
Security-covered employment (this triggers Social Security WEP and GPO provisions).
2Rent, mortgage amounts, mortgage lengths, mortgage payments, property taxes, condo fees,
homeowners insurance, maintenance, etc. are included, as well as up to two future changes in the
primary home, symmetric data on the current vacation home data and up to two changes in the
vacation home and other real estate properties.
3Other items included are funeral expenses, desired bequests, current life insurance (face and
cash values), preferences about maintaining living standards of survivors, contingent plans (e.g.,
what survivors will earn and how they will change their housing), and the maximum amount the
household can borrow.
4The precise algorithm is proprietary to Economic Security Planning, Inc., which uses it in its
commercial lifetime financial planning tools. But its details are available to academic researchers
upon receipt of a request emailed to www.kotilkoff@gmail.com, subject to the signing of a non-
disclosure agreement.
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Social Security benefits. To forecast future earnings using past waves of the Current
Population Survey through 2013, we follow the methodology used in Auerbach et al.
(2016) and Auerbach et al. (2018). Future mortality of household members, assumed
to begin at age 55 and end with certain death at age 100, is also projected using
the method described in Auerbach et al. (2016) and Auerbach et al. (2018). And,
as in that study, the present value of human resources, spending, and net taxes are
calculated as probability-weighted averages of their outcomes for all possible survivor
paths for either a single person or married couple. Auerbach et al. (2019) provides
details of updates to TFA subsequent to the Auerbach et al. (2016) and Auerbach et
al. (2018) studies.
1.4.3 Reduced Form






where Ci is consumption of household i at year 2014, R is remaining lifetime net
resources of household i, and ai is the APC of household i. Notice that ai is not
defined when remaining lifetime net resources is zero.
We assume APC to be a function of a vector of variables Z:
a = f(Z) (1.11)
where Z in standard theory includes interest rate, impatience factor, and utility
function parameters. In our analysis, we suggest that Z may also include remaining
lifetime net resources R itself. APC may also be affected by other individual char-
acteristics, such as age, health condition, size of the family, etc. To summarize, we
propose Z = (interest rate, impatience factor, utility function parameters, R, age,
health condition, size of the family,...) .
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Suppose the f function has the following linear form:
ai = β + γRi + ΓXi (1.12)
where the constant term β includes the impact of interest rate, impatience factor,
coefficient of risk aversion, etc. Xi includes all other impact factors except the net
resources, including demographic variables.
According to equation 1.10 and 1.12, consumption could be expressed as a function
of the net resources and all other variables Xi as follows:
Ci = βRi + γR
2
i + ΓRiXi (1.13)
where consumption Ci is not defined when remaining lifetime net resources is zero.
We formulate our baseline regressions according to equation 1.12 and 1.13.
1.4.4 Baseline Regression
Baseline Regression One
We propose two regression forms in our analysis. Based on the reduced form in
equation 1.12, we suggest the baseline regression on APC and show results in both
log resources and level of resources:
ai = β + γRi + ΓXi + µi (1.14)
The parameter of interest is γ. If γ is negative, consumption rate is decreasing, and







Based on the reduced form in equation 1.13, we suggest the following baseline regres-
sion on consumption:
Ci = α + βRi + γR
2
i + ΓRiXi + µi (1.16)
where we include a constant term for flexibility purpose, even it does not show up in
the reduced form. Compared with the first baseline regression, we allow the definition
of consumption when resources are zero. The average propensity to consume ai of
household i based on the above regression 1.16 is
ai = α/Ri + β + γRi + ΓXi (1.17)
If the APC is decreasing, the rich save more and consume less.
∂ai
∂Ri





Since α is the consumption when resources are zero,
α
Ri






is small enough and we should expect γ < 0 in most cases.
1.4.5 IV Regression
Why We Need IV
According to our baseline regressions, we can get an unbiased estimate of γ if we
can measure remaining lifetime net resources precisely and choose the right group of
control variables such that all independent variables are uncorrelated with the error
term.
The exogeneity assumption could be violated easily here. We are concerned that
potential behavior factors that could affect resources accumulation may also be linked
with preferences towards saving or consumption. For example, a hard worker could
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also be more patient. Thus, there are the households which gain more human wealth
as well as net resources and also save more. We have shown that risk tolerance,
impatience factor, and investment ability could affect consumption rate, as shown in
the model. If there is no heterogeneity, they are shown in the constant term β in the
baseline regression one. If there is heterogeneity, they enter into the error term as
omitted variables and correlate with resources. Because of restrictions in HRS data
which does not contain that information on households, lifetime net resources may
just be picking heterogeneity.
Suppose the true population model is
a = β + γR + ΓX + ΣjφjBj (1.19)
and we are omitting the individual behavioral factors B′js. The relationship between
Bj, R and X is
Bj = ψj + ωjR + ΩjX (1.20)
Then, the OLS regressor is biased and
plimN→∞γ̂
OLS = γ + Σjφjωj (1.21)
We summarize the impact of different individual behavioral factors on the OLS
regressor in Table 1.2. If ωj > 0, the specific behavior Bj increases the ability
to gain resources. If φj > 0, the specific behavior Bj increases the preference for
consumption. There are examples of both upward and downward bias of a behavior.
Whether the OLS estimator is upward biased or downward biased depends on the
aggregate effect of those behavioral factors. Most reasonable behavioral factors would
predict a downward bias in the OLS coefficient.
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Construct Wealth Luck Instruments
As we discussed in the model section, if there is an unanticipated small exogenous
positive shock to resources, we can distinguish between the heterogeneity and bequest
motives explanation. An ideal instrument would be a free lottery. But because of data
limitation, we try the following way instead. First, we calculate the return of total
assets of households and define households with abnormally high positive/negative
return as having good/bad luck. We define the wealth luck indicators as follows.
Step 1: Compute annualized total assets return rate from year t to t+ 2 (wave n
to n+ 1):
rait = 0.5 ∗ [ai,t+2/(ait + 2wit − 2cit)− 1] (1.22)
where ait, wit, and cit are total assets, wage income, and consumption of household i
at year t.





0 −i% 6 rait 6 i%
1 rait > i%
(1.23)
where i = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30. For robustness check, we also try the one-side good
luck indicator and the one-side bad luck indicator where
Zgoodit =
{
0 rait 6 i%




−1 rait < −i%
0 −i% 6 rait
(1.25)
Step 3: Define assets-weighted luck for household i using luck indicators from all
years for household i
Zi = ΣtaitZit (1.26)
ait = Σj∈ageiajt/N (1.27)
where ait is the average assets of households who have the same age as household i.
17
We also try the unweighted luck indicator defined as follows:
Zi = ΣtZit (1.28)
Assumptions
The null hypothesis is that there is no heterogeneity H0 : ρi = ρ, ri = r, σi = σ. The
relevance assumption is that the wealth luck instrument has a causal effect on lifetime
net resources. And the assumption is satisfied by construction since the wealth luck
instrument represents large positive or negative returns which increase or decrease
wealth as well as lifetime net resources.
The exclusion restriction is that the wealth luck instrument should affect con-
sumption rate only through resources and cannot be correlated with the error term in
the baseline regression. One concern about the validity of our instrument is that we
do not consider the possibility of different portfolios. If the null hypothesis is true, we
can expect there would be no difference in household portfolios. The portfolio risks
are the same, and the return rates calculated using changes in total private assets
in equation 1.22 do not need to be adjusted for risks. If we construct the wealth
luck IV by using risk-adjusted returns, the null hypothesis is rejected by consider-
ing heterogeneous portfolios. Another concern is that large returns may not only be
caused by luck. People can persistently earn high returns, not because of luck, but,
for example, because they make better investment decisions. If this reason is true, the
null hypothesis is rejected because there are households not experiencing persistent
high returns, meaning the ability to invest is heterogeneous. Persistent high returns
could also be caused by less risk aversion. Households with less risk aversion can
systematically earn higher market returns. Again, this rejects the null hypothesis.
The third concern is that we are comparing returns with some certain cutoffs. This
does not take the changes in the market environment into account. It can be resolved
by also comparing how many standard deviations are household returns away from
the average returns at the same time. We will incorporate this tactic into the next
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version. To summarize, we assume that both abnormally high and infrequent return
are of pure luck. The wealth luck instrument is not correlated with risk tolerance,
impatience factor, or investment ability that we are concerned about. Thus, the
instrument is exogenous.
We summarize the testable implications of the two explanations in table 1.3. As
long as the OLS and IV results are systematically different, heterogeneity exists. As
long as the IV coefficient of resources is negative and significant, there is a causal
effect of wealth on consumption rate and bequest motives explain why the rich save
more.
2SLS
Because the second baseline regression on consumption requires multiple instruments
and is demanding, we focus on the IV strategy for the first baseline regression on APC
which requires only one instrument. We use the log form of resources for interpretation
purposes. The first stage of the IV regression is
log(Ri) = δ + ΘZi + ΛXi + µi (1.29)
The second stage of the IV regression is
APCi = β
IV + γIV ̂log(Ri) + ΓIVXi + µi (1.30)
where R̂i is the predicted value of the net resources from the first stage.
1.5 Data
1.5.1 Data Overview
We use the household-level financial data from the Health and Retirement Studies
(HRS) and consumption data from the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey
(CAMS) ans also use the 2014 HRS and 2015 CAMS data to run the baseline and IV
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regressions. To construct the instruments, we are using eight waves of the HRS from
2000 to 2014 and the CAMS from 2001 to 2015. Our calculation of remaining lifetime
net resources is based on the HRS using the TFA. The HRS data also provides us the
group of control variables.
1.5.2 2014 Health and Retirement Study
The HRS is a national longitudinal survey of individuals over the age of 50 and
their spouses or partners and is conducted every two years. It contains information
on demographics, income, assets, health, cognition, family structure, health care,
housing, job, expectations, and insurance. The first wave was conducted in 1992 and
we are using the latest 2014 wave. In the 2014 wave, the HRS interviewed 18,747
respondents belonging to 12,746 households. In this paper, we are working with the
household-level data.
Table 1.4 shows average demographic statistics by remaining lifetime net resources
quintile. The age(s) of the main and second respondents, if any, are about the same,
around 60s to 70s. Households with higher net resources tend to have more adults
and children. Disability is an indicator variable which equals one if the respondent
is disabled and zero if not. Households with higher net resources are less likely to be
disabled. Education is an indicator variable, which equals zero if the respondent has
less than high school education, one if high school education, and two if some college
or more education. The average education level for the main respondent in all groups
is above high school. The second respondent has an average education level lower
than the main respondent. The education level of both respondents increases as net
resources increase. The race as an indicator variable is equal to one if the respondent
is White and zero if Black. If there is a second respondent, the race of the two
respondents is the same in most cases. Most respondents are White. Health is a self-
rated indicator variable valued from 1 to 5, where 1 represents excellent health, and 5
represents poor health. In general, respondents with higher net resources would rate
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themselves healthier, the second respondent feels better about their health condition
than the first respondent, and there is not much difference in the two respondents’
health rating. The cash-constrained indicator is the indicator of the severity of cash
constraint. We will talk about the procedure of constructing it in section 1.6.3. The
larger the indicator number is, the more severe the cash constraint is for the particular
household. Households with higher net resources are less constrained.
1.5.3 2015 Consumption and Activities Mail Survey
A random sample of 8,039 households from HRS 2014 was asked to participate in
the 2015 wave of CAMS and 5,423 responded. CAMS has three main topics: Part
A is about activities or uses of time; Part B collects data on spending, including
anticipations and realizations about changes in spending at retirement; and Part C
asks for information about marital status and labor force participation.
CAMS questions are about household spending. However, for the purposes of this
paper, we are interested in household consumption. Consumption is different from
spending on items like durables (e.g., automobile, television, computer, etc.) and
housing in which the purchase occurs in one period, but the item provides utility for
more than one period. Specifically, we distinguish between durables spending and
consumption; transportation spending and consumption; and housing spending and
consumption. Nondurables spending and consumption are the same since utility is
obtained immediately after the purchase and there is no element of savings.
Total consumption is a sum of four components: durables, nondurables, trans-
portation, and housing. Durables goods include refrigerators, washing machines and
dryers, dishwashers, televisions, computers, and furnishings. Nondurable goods in-
clude clothing, gasoline, groceries, utilities such as electricity, and entertainment or
services such as dining and trips/vacations. We follow RAND and calculate the
transportation consumption as a flow of services which comes from the total value of
vehicles observed in the HRS. The consumption of housing is the sum of the rental
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equivalent of the owned house, property tax, homeowners’ insurance, plus any actual
rent the household pays for additional properties. For renters, housing consumption
is identical to housing spending and equal to the rent.
Table 1.5 shows total consumption in the year 2014 and all subcategories of con-
sumption as a fraction of remaining lifetime resources. For total consumption and
each category of consumption, the rich consume more at an absolute level but less as
a fraction of net resources. Households consume nondurable goods most, accounting
for about 60% of all consumption, and durable goods least, accounting for less than
1%. Housing and transportation hold the same proportion of consumption for the
group with the lowest net resources. But the richer households consume more housing
than transportation.
1.5.4 Variables from TFA
We apply TFA to each household in the 2014 HRS to project future net taxes and
human and nonhuman wealth and calculate their present values. Human wealth is
the present value of all future earnings. Nonhuman (or private) wealth includes all
financial assets (stocks, bonds, mutual funds, checking and saving accounts) and real
estate assets minus the value of all liabilities. Net taxes include federal and state taxes
that households have to pay minus the transfer payments it receives. All variables
from TFA represent discounted present values.
Table 1.6 shows net resources and each category of resources as the percentage
of net resources by remaining lifetime net resources quintile. The big differences
in net resources are mostly generated by private wealth inequality. Since they are
deducted from gross resources, net taxes decrease the inequality in net resources and
occupy a larger share when net resources increase. The inequality in human wealth
first increases and then decreases as net resources increase. The inequality in private
wealth is always larger than that in human wealth.
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1.5.5 Data Set Construction
Data is constructed in several steps. First of all, data from the CAMS is merged
with the data from the HRS and then with results of the TFA. Second, we remove all
non-responses and drop observations with negative or zero total income and with re-
maining lifetime net resources less than 5000. Table 1.7 shows how many observations




In figure 1·1, we plot consumption rate on quintiles of lifetime net resources using
both predictions of the standard model and data-generated items. The decreasing
pattern still holds clearly whether we use level or log forms of resources. The standard
model predicts that the consumption rate is a horizontal line. Our data shows that
the consumption rate is decreasing as lifetime net resources increase. The standard
model fails to generate facts consistent with the data. Now the model leaves us with
two possible explanations: bequest motives and heterogeneity. If heterogeneity is the
reason for decreasing APC, each point in the graph is generated by different return
rates, impatience factors, and risk aversion. The rich are born to be more patient,
better at investment, and more risk averse. A poor person who becomes rich because
of a lottery game would be an outlier and spend much more than his or her peers.
A random redistribution of resources would destroy the decreasing pattern. If the
rich save more because of bequest motives, the decreasing pattern will remain after a
random redistribution of resources because, with more resources, marginal utility in
consumption decreases faster than marginal utility in bequeathing. It is optimal to
leave a greater proportion of resources to descendants.
We discussed our baseline regression in section 1.4.4. We include the following
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key demographic variables in control variables X in our baseline regression: child
count, adult count, age, disability, and health. The regression result on APC is
represented in Table 1.8. Coefficients of resources are negative and significant in all
forms and groups. Thus, consumption rate is decreasing in resources. The average
APC for the full sample is 0.057, which means an average household spends 5.7%
of its lifetime resources today. The full-sample results with log resources show that
when net resources increase 1%, APC decreases by 0.0003, which is about 0.5% of
the sample average APC. If lifetime net resources of household A are twice that of
household B, household A will keep 3% of its resources in its pocket rather than
spending 100% more. As the HRS and TFA computed data indicates, there is huge
inequality in resources. One household’s resources could be 2n times that of another
and n is up to 7. Thus, the extra resources kept in the pocket are huge. Lifetime net
resources are presented in millions for results with levels. The full-sample results with
the level of resources show that, when net resources increase by one million which is
about the average resources of the third quintile, APC decreases by 0.01, about 1/6
of the sample average APC. The coefficients of control variables are not consistent in
the log and level forms in the full sample.
To demonstrate how quickly APC decreases, we divide households by resources
into five quintile groups. Table 1.9 shows the predicted APC decreases quickly when
net resources increase. For all regressions, the average APC for the lowest group
is about 0.08. The average APC for the highest group is about 2 standard errors
smaller, around 0.03.
The key coefficients of the worker and retiree groups seem to be different in Table
1.8. We use the following regression to test whether the two groups are statistically
different.
ait = β + γRit + ΓXit + κ1(retired) + δ1(retired)Rit + ∆1(retired)Xit + µit (1.31)
where 1(retired) is an indicator of retiree group. The coefficients and t-stats of retiree
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group indicator and interaction terms are shown in table 1.10. The joint p-values
show that the two groups are statistically different and that the difference between
the two groups is economically significant. The consumption rate in the retiree group
decreases at about 1.5 times the worker group speed as resources increase.
Baseline Regression Two
We include the same set of key demographic variables as the first baseline regression
to interact with resources as control variables. The regression result on consumption
is represented in Table 1.11. Resources are in millions. The coefficients of the square
term of remaining lifetime net resources are negative and significant for all groups,
indicating that the rich have smaller APC and save more. Because it is difficult
to recognize the impact of resources on APC directly from the table, we show the
estimated APC from each regression in Table 1.12. The APC decreases quickly as
resources increase. For all regressions, the average APC for the lowest group is about
0.10. The average APC for the highest group is about 2 standard errors smaller,
around 0.03. The estimated APC is of the same magnitude as the estimated APC of
the first baseline regression for each quintile cohort.
The number of children does not matter significantly. In this HRS data, most
of the households are about to retire or already retired, as suggested by summary
statistics of age in Table 1.4. The child-rearing expenses including housing, food,
care, and education for those older parents would be much smaller than that for
younger parents, who are not in our sample, because major parental expenses made
on children are from birth through early adulthood. The number of adults would
significantly affect consumption. The three groups of regressions show that with
one more adult in a family with one million resources in total, the consumption
would increase by 5631 for the current year. Elderly households consume more in
the worker group and less in the retiree group. Disabled households consume less in
the worker group and more in the retiree group. The effect of age and disability is
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not significant for the full sample. Health condition is only significant for the full
sample. Households with worse health conditions consume less and save more for the
bad conditions precautionarily.
We formally test the difference between the worker and retiree group by the fol-
lowing specification.
Cit = α + βRit + γR
2
it + ΓRitXit + θ1(retired)
+ κ1(retired)Rit + δ1(retired)R2it + ∆1(retired)RitXit + µit
(1.32)
The results are shown in table 1.13. The two groups are significantly different. The
coefficient of the interaction term of retiree indicator and square term of resources
are positive and significant. The consumption for the worker group decreases quickly
as resources increase, which is opposite to the group difference test result of the first
baseline regression on APC. Age and disability play different roles in the worker and
retiree group.
1.6.2 Wealth Luck as IV
We talked about how we construct the wealth luck instruments in section 1.4.5. The
wealth luck indicators are strongly correlated with lifetime net resources by construc-
tion. We assume high return is pure luck, and thus the wealth luck instrument is not
correlated with risk tolerance, impatience factor, and investment ability. The instru-
ment is exogenous. We use past waves of HRS to construct panel data of household
private wealth (total assets).
Figure 1·2 shows the histogram of annualized private wealth return from the year
2012 to the year 2014. The return of private wealth varies a lot in the sample and
ranges from -85 to 172. Over eighty percent of the return is within [ -2, 2 ]. About
fifty percent of the households have wealth returns larger than 20% or less than -20%.
Figure 1·3 shows the histogram of wealth luck indicators.
Table 1.14 shows the first stage results of the two-sided assets-weighted luck IV
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regressions with different cutoffs. The validity of the instrument is robust to different
cutoffs of luck definition. Wealth luck indicator is positively correlated with resources.
An agent with one million in net resources and one more year of luck in investment
increases net resources by 7.57% if we set the luck cutoff to be 20%.
Table 1.15 shows the main IV results of the two-sided assets-weighted luck IV
regressions with different cutoffs. Using wealth luck as an instrument, APC is still
decreasing in resources. If there is only heterogeneity, the main IV results would pre-
dict a constant consumption rate. According to the testable implications summarized
in table 1.3, we conclude that the relationship between resources and consumption
rate is casual. Bequest motives explain why the rich save more. The coefficient is
about 1.7 times the OLS coefficient in table 1.8 full-sample log regression (1). When
net resources increase 1%, APC decreases by 0.0005, which is about 1% of the sample
average APC. If lifetime net resources of household A are twice that of household B,
household A will keep 5% of its resources in the pocket rather than spending 100%
more.
We use the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to check whether the IV and OLS regressors
of resources are different. The null hypothesis is that there is no systematic difference
in γIV and γOLS. Under the null hypothesis, the following statements are true and
equivalent: (1) γOLS is efficient and consistent, (2) there is no endogeneity issue,
and (3) there is no heterogeneity if there is no measurement error in resources. The
p-value of the test is 0.02649, which is smaller than 0.05. Thus, we can reject the
null hypothesis. It is still too early to conclude whether heterogeneity plays a role or
not. First, the bias in OLS could be caused by measurement errors in resources, not
heterogeneity. We can use another measure of resources as an instrument; for example,
future or lagged resources can eliminate measurement error. We will include the result
in the next version. Second, the upward biased OLS regression result is consistent
with the case where people who are better at investment also spend extravagantly.
But the most reasonable forms of heterogeneity would predict a downward bias in
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OLS, as we discussed in table 1.2. So there seems to be little role for heterogeneity
in abilities to invest, impatience factors, and risk tolerances. The coefficients of all
control variables keep the same sign and level of significance. We show the first stage
and main IV results of other definitions of luck in the Appendix. These results also
support both bequest motives and heterogeneity explanations.
We present the estimated APC with different cutoffs in table 1.16. The APC
decreases quickly. The APC of the highest resources group is about 3 standard
deviations smaller than that of the lowest resources group.
1.6.3 Borrowing Constraints
The baseline and IV regression control for some key demographic variables. Besides
the demographic factors that may be linked to consumption behavior, borrowing
constraints exercise important influence on household consumption behavior. When
a borrowing condition is binding, households are constrained at their borrowing limit,
although without it they might consume more. Thus, constrained households have a
lower propensity to consume out of their lifetime net resources.
The Borrowing Constrained Indicator
We identify borrowing-constrained households and construct a borrowing-constrained
severity indicator, using the TFA. We calculated it using the following procedure.
First, we use the TFA to calculate the standards of living through the household
lifetime. If households are not borrowing-constrained for their full life, their con-
sumption is totally smoothing. Otherwise, there is a jump in their consumption at
some time. During the years before the jump, households are borrowing-constrained.
Then, we calculate the number of years before the standard of living rises for the first
time. Cash-constrained indicator is the inverse of the number of years. Therefore,
the higher the indicator number is, the fewer years a particular household is con-
strained for and, thus, more severe is the cash constraint because fewer resources are
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available during those years. Through our way of constructing the cash-constrained
indicator, we are not able to distinguish between the households who are either never
constrained or forever constrained because there would be no jump in consumption
in those cases. We are still working on this issue case by case.
Before analyzing the impact of borrowing constraints on consumption, it would be
helpful to understand the borrowing-constraint indicator better. We analyze the indi-
cator by net lifetime resource percentiles and by age groups and compare constraints
among workers and retirees.
First, we check the relationship between the borrowing-constrained indicator and
the MPC out of cash-on-hand. We define cash-on-hand as the sum of total household
annual income, checking accounts, savings accounts, and value of financial assets, in-
cluding stocks, bonds, and CDs. The resources that are available to cash-constrained
households are cash-on-hand plus some amount of money they can borrow, usually a
small fraction of their wealth. Thus, the marginal propensity to consume out of cash-
of-hand approaches one for those households. Figure 1·4 plots the median MPC out
of cash-on-hand on the number of years for which households are constrained before
the first consumption jump. The least severely constrained group, with the number
of years constrained larger than 10 and borrowing constrained indicator valued 0 -
0.1, has the lowest MPC out of cash-on-hand, which is consistent with the definition
of being borrowing-constrained.
Then, we calculate the median borrowing constrained indicator and median con-
sumption to the cash-on-hand ratio for each net resource quintile group. As we can
see from Figure 1·5 (a), the borrowing constraints are the most severe for the first
quintile, and the first quintile has the highest MPC out of cash-on-hand.
Next, we calculate the same values for each age cohort. Figure 1·5 (b) illustrates
that borrowing constraints are the most severe for the elderly and the MPC out of
cash-on-hand falls significantly with age.
Finally, we examine the difference in these values across retirees and workers.
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Figure 1·6 shows that the borrowing constraints are more severe for retired people in
each of the net resource percentiles while the ratio of consumption to cash on hand
is smaller for retired people in each of the net resource percentiles.
Borrowing Constrained Indicator and Consumption Rate
Based on the first baseline and IV regression with a two-sided and assets-weighted
luck instrument generated by total assets, we add cash-constrained indicator as one
of the control variables. The results are presented in Table 1.17 and Table 1.18
correspondingly. In the IV regression, households which are constrained for 1 year
have a 1.4% lower consumption rate than households that are constrained for 10
years. More importantly, our key result still holds. APC is decreasing with net
resources and the coefficient has the same magnitude as previous regressions. The
IV regression coefficient is larger in absolute value than the OLS coefficient. By
considering heterogeneous borrowing constraints, we still arrive at the result that
both heterogeneous impatience factors or risk tolerance or investment ability and
bequest motives explain why the rich save more.
Based on the second baseline OLS regression, we add cash constrained indicator
interacting with net resources as one of the control variables. The results are presented
in Table 1.19. Again, our key result still holds. The coefficient of the square term
of net resources is negative and significant. APC is decreasing in net resources, and
the rich consume less and save more. The net resources have a similar impact on
APC quantitatively as the baseline regression. All other control variables have the
same interpretation and the quantitative impact is similar to the baseline regression.
Because we just have one instrument, we are not able to run IV regression for this
specification.
For the full sample, the more severely constrained households consume less. House-
holds which are borrowing-constrained for one year consume 7557 dollars less than
households which are borrowing-constrained for over ten years if both of them have
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one million resources. This is quantitatively large, about 13% of the average con-
sumption. For some reason, the worker group and retiree group separately are not
significantly affected by cash constraint. The result for the full sample is intuitive.
1.6.4 Breaking Down the Households’ Wealth
In this section, we break net resources into the three main parts, i.e., private wealth,
human wealth, and net taxes. We want to know whether the consumption rate is
decreasing in each part of net resources. We see that consumption rate is decreasing
in net resources, private wealth, human wealth, and net taxes from Figure 1·7. To
check more rigorously by controlling other demographic characteristics, we perform
regression analysis. Here we are only able to show the OLS regression results because
IV regression requires multiple instruments.
Based on the first baseline regression, we propose the following regression:
ait = β + γwWit + γhHit + γtTit + ΓXit + µit (1.33)
The results are shown in Table 1.20. Coefficients of each part of net resources are
significant and negative; thus, APC is decreasing in private wealth, human wealth,
and negative net taxes, i.e., net transfers. We do not show results in log forms
because many households have negative net taxes and would provide few observations.
APC does increase as the level of net taxes increases. Although the tax system is
sophisticated, with roughly 30 tax-transfer programs, with different rules households
are able to figure out the direct impact of taxes on consumption. This result is
important to our contribution to measuring net taxes precisely. Consumption rate
increases significantly as net taxes increase; thus net taxes play an important role and
cannot be neglected.
Another way to check whether the consumption rate is responsive to each part
of the three main components is to instrument net resources with each part. The
coefficient of net resources by instrumenting represents the contribution of each part.
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The results are shown in Table 1.21. We get results consistent with Table 1.20. APC
responds to each part of net resources.
We further categorize private wealth into liquid assets and illiquid assets. We
define liquid assets to be the sum of cash, checking, savings, money market accounts,
and mutual funds, stocks, bonds, and T-Bills. The rest of private wealth are illiquid
assets, including housing net of mortgages and home equity loans, retirement ac-
counts, life insurance, etc. We plot the consumption rate on liquid and illiquid assets
in Figure 1·8. The consumption rate on illiquid assets is clearly decreasing. We use
a formal regression result to check the observations with the graph. The regression
specification is




it + γhHit + γtTit + ΓXit + µit (1.34)
where AL and AIL are liquid and illiquid assets correspondingly.
The results are shown in Table 1.22. Again, we only show results in levels because
by taking logs many observations would drop because of negative net taxes, liquid
assets, and illiquid assets. APC does not change with liquid assets and decreases with
illiquid assets. One possible reason is that there is a significant number of hand-to-
mouth households which consume their liquid assets and the MPC is always close to
one out of liquid assets. APC still decreases as human wealth increases and net taxes
decrease. Interpretations of control variables are consistent with the baseline results.
We apply the same experiment for the second baseline regression on consumption
and show the two sets of regression results in Table 1.23. APC is decreasing in
private wealth, human wealth, and illiquid assets. APC does not respond to net
taxes, which contradicts the result regressing on consumption rate. The magnitude
of the estimated APC is consistent with the baseline regression. Interpretations of
control variables are consistent with the baseline results.
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1.7 Conclusion
This paper empirically answers the long-debated question of whether the rich save
more than other economic groups. We use the software The Fiscal Analyzer (TFA) to
precisely measure remaining lifetime net resources. The main challenge is estimating
human wealth and net taxes. We have access to the restricted data of HRS and
forecast future earnings based on the earnings history of households. We calculate
accurate net taxes, based on the geographic location of households. And we construct
wealth luck as an instrument to resolve the endogeneity issue caused by consumption
behavioral factors that are also linked with the ability to accumulate wealth. The
IV regression result shows that the consumption rate decreases significantly quickly
when lifetime net resources increase. Thus the rich save more and the relationship is
causal.
We show that a standard model could only generate a constant consumption
rate. Thus we consider two alternatives: a model with bequest motives and a model
with heterogeneity. Testable implications of the two models show that the rich save
more because of bequest motives. The upward bias in OLS regression indicates that
there is little role for heterogeneity. The statistically and economically significant IV
coefficient shows that bequest motives play a role.
One direction worth exploring is to investigate the quantitative impact of decreas-
ing consumption rates on inequality and intergenerational wealth distribution. It
is still unclear whether the influence is economically meaningful. Welfare analysis
should be conducted as well we policy analysis, accordingly.
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Table 1.1: List of Tax and Transfer Programs Included in TFA
Personal Income Tax (federal and state)
Corporate Income Tax (federal and state)
Taxes FICA Tax (federal)
Sales Taxes (state)
Medicare Part B Premiums (federal)
Estate and Gift Tax (federal)
Earned Income Tax Credit (federal and state)
Child Tax Credit (federal)
Social Security Benefits (federal)
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) (federal)
Transfer Programs Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP) (state)
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) (state)
Medicaid
Medicare (federal)
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) (state)
Section 8 Housing Vouchers (state and county)
Childcare Assistance (state and county)
Table 1.2: Bias Caused by Behavioral Factors Bj in the OLS Estimator
Bias Formula Example
Upward φjωj>0 Better investors spend money more extravagantly.
Hard workers are more patient.
Downward φjωj<0 Better investors are more risk averse.
Highly-educated people are better at investment.
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Table 1.3: Testable Implications of the Two Explanations
model implications
heterogeneity bequest motives γ < 0 and significant OLS and IV
yes no no different
no yes yes same
yes yes yes different
Table 1.4: Demographics by Net Resources Quintile
Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Top 5% Top 1%
Age (Respondent 1) 72.80 68.37 64.84 62.73 61.67 61.72 62.94
Age (Respondent 2) 77.21 70.95 65.15 63.25 61.85 63.09 63.12
Child Count 0.04 0.09 0.16 0.28 0.27 0.22 0.17
Adult Count 1.20 1.62 1.72 1.79 1.89 1.90 2.00
Household Count 1.24 1.71 1.88 2.07 2.15 2.12 2.17
Disability (Respondent 1) 0.16 0.22 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.05
Disability (Respondent 2) 0.08 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.00
Education (Respondent 1) 1.24 1.36 1.58 1.72 1.83 1.94 1.96
Education (Respondent 2) 0.70 0.85 0.95 0.95 0.99 1.00 1.00
Race (Respondent 1) 1.13 1.08 1.07 1.04 1.02 1.02 1.02
Race (Respondent 2) 1.13 1.06 1.06 1.04 1.01 1.02 1.02
Health (Respondent 1) 3.05 2.84 2.69 2.47 2.19 1.90 2.12
Health (Respondent 2) 3.12 3.07 2.71 2.57 2.34 2.07 1.91
Cash Constrained 0.33 0.20 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.03
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Table 1.5: Average Consumption by Net Resources Quintile
Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Top 5% Top 1%
Total Consumption 32520.05 45287.95 54968.62 67161.07 90431.53 125782.10 141310.23
Consumption (% of Net Resources)
Total 8.537 6.779 5.678 4.637 3.006 2.185 1.412
Durables 0.050 0.050 0.032 0.036 0.025 0.017 0.004
Nondurables 5.068 4.134 3.261 2.581 1.688 1.296 0.920
Housing 1.625 1.248 1.165 0.986 0.684 0.500 0.353
Transportation 1.795 1.348 1.220 1.033 0.609 0.371 0.135
Table 1.6: Average Resources by Net Resources Quintile
Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Top 5% Top 1%
Net Resources 396352.32 672796.33 970941.55 1450357.50 3382358.83 6189685.59 10381832.34
Resources (% of Net Resources)
1. Private Wealth 24.29 30.27 35.61 45.25 67.85 87.44 100.33
(1) Regular Assets 7.66 8.88 12.91 17.46 32.97 53.52 70.27
(2) Primary Home Equity 15.32 18.31 16.27 15.75 12.21 10.20 7.68
(3) Other Real Estate Assets 0.65 1.31 1.97 3.69 4.37 6.86 12.25
(4) Retirement Account 0.66 1.77 4.46 8.35 18.30 16.85 10.13
2. Human Wealth 7.20 9.95 22.75 32.93 34.49 25.15 10.81
(1) Employment Income PV 5.51 7.51 18.14 27.53 30.00 22.56 9.96
(2) Self-Employment Income PV 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.52 0.52 0.00
3. Net Taxes -68.51 -59.78 -41.64 -21.81 2.34 12.59 11.14
(1) State Taxes PV 0.07 0.13 0.46 0.94 1.64 1.38 0.96
(2) Federal Taxes PV 0.36 0.61 1.85 4.03 8.23 8.80 5.36
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Table 1.7: Data Cleaning
N of Observations
Original HRS-2014 12,746
Merging with CAMS-2015 6,523
Merging with TFA Results 3,250
Remove Non-Responses 3,043
Remove Total Income ≤ 0 3,052
Remove Remaining Lifetime Net Resources < 5000 2,717
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Table 1.8: Baseline Regression on APC for the Full Sample, Workers and Retirees
C/R
Full Sample Workers Retirees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log level log level log level
R -0.0308*** -0.0109*** -0.0229*** -0.00840*** -0.0354*** -0.0133***
(-18.23) (-11.99) (-10.37) (-8.44) (-14.63) (-9.02)
nchild 0.00367 0.00224 -0.0000968 -0.00140 0.0106** 0.01000**
(1.63) (0.95) (-0.04) (-0.64) (2.34) (2.11)
nadult 0.00750*** -0.00263 0.00663** -0.000650 0.00704** -0.00404
(3.27) (-1.17) (2.21) (-0.23) (2.14) (-1.23)
age 0.0000432 0.000398*** 0.000421** 0.000597*** -0.000118 0.000186
(0.39) (3.57) (2.52) (3.54) (-0.60) (0.92)
disability -0.00595** -0.00391 -0.00642* -0.00531 -0.00709 -0.00536
(-2.11) (-1.34) (-1.88) (-1.53) (-1.61) (-1.16)
health -0.00261** -0.000269 0.000130 0.00212 -0.00376** -0.00182
(-2.11) (-0.21) (0.08) (1.32) (-2.13) (-0.99)
N 2169 2169 929 929 1240 1240
R2 0.1588 0.0900 0.1432 0.1119 0.1611 0.0763
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.9: Estimated average APC (%) from Table 1.8
Regression s.e. Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Top 5% Top 1%
(1) Full, log 2.06 8.18 6.77 5.81 4.75 2.66 0.68 -0.96
(2) Full, level 1.70 7.14 6.53 6.08 5.51 3.36 0.31 -4.25
(3) Workers, log 1.78 8.03 6.78 5.89 4.96 3.34 1.84 0.70
(4) Workers, level 1.53 7.10 6.48 6.00 5.43 3.72 1.33 -2.10
(5) Retirees, log 2.33 8.42 6.84 5.85 4.74 2.34 0.07 -1.89
(6) Retirees, level 1.96 7.34 6.75 6.39 5.86 3.29 -0.42 -6.06
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R ∗ retired -0.0125*** -0.00490***
(-3.55) (-2.69)
nchild ∗ retired 0.0107** 0.0114**
(2.20) (2.27)
nadult ∗ retired 0.000416 -0.00339
(0.09) (-0.73)
age ∗ retired -0.000539** -0.000411
(-1.97) (-1.46)
disability ∗ retired -0.000669 -0.0000552
(-0.11) (-0.01)




Joint p-value 0.0025 0.0129
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Coefficients of R and X are not reported.
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Table 1.11: Baseline Regression on Consumption for the Full Sample,
Workers and Retirees
Full Sample Workers Retirees
(1) (2) (3)
Current Consumption
R 21233.6*** 4760.2 28085.2***
(4.43) (0.58) (3.77)
R2 -1480.9*** -1654.8*** -861.8***
(-9.69) (-7.12) (-3.92)
nchild ∗R 743.7 182.9 1965.7
(0.80) (0.15) (1.15)
nadult ∗R 5630.7*** 4171.7* 5322.1***
(4.10) (1.83) (3.15)
age ∗R -28.31 268.3*** -190.7**
(-0.56) (2.94) (-2.18)
disability ∗R -465.0 -4182.9** 4250.0*
(-0.32) (-2.05) (1.79)
health ∗R -1852.7*** -860.2 -1437.9
(-2.78) (-0.82) (-1.63)
Constant 28451.9*** 30705.8*** 28561.1***
(19.92) (11.06) (18.11)
N 2169 929 1240
R2 0.2591 0.2318 0.2608
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.12: Estimated APC (%) from Table 1.11
s.e. Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Top 5% Top 1%
(1) Full 2.54 9.70 6.49 5.23 4.28 3.15 2.26 1.46
(2) Workers 2.95 10.88 7.14 5.65 4.54 3.25 2.26 1.40
(3) Retirees 2.46 9.43 6.33 5.11 4.20 3.16 2.41 1.83
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R ∗ retired 23325.0**
(2.11)
R2 ∗ retired 793.0**
(2.47)
nchild ∗R ∗ retired 1782.8
(0.81)
nadult ∗R ∗ retired 1150.4
(0.42)
age ∗R ∗ retired -459.0***
(-3.61)
disability ∗R ∗ retired 8433.0***
(2.63)





t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Coefficients of R, R2 and RX are not reported.
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Table 1.14: First Stage IV Regression by Total Assets with Two-sided and Assets-weighted luck
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cutoff 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Z 0.0418*** 0528*** 0.0612*** 0.0793*** 0.0863*** 0.0841***
(5.168) (5.903) (6.278) (7.475) (7.492) (6.730)
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105
R2 0.326 0.329 0.330 0.336 0.336 0.332
IV F-stat 26.71 34.84 39.42 55.88 56.13 45.30
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.15: IV Regression by Total Assets with Two-sided and Assets-weighted luck
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cutoff 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
log(R) -0.0550*** -0.0580*** -0.0530*** -0.0515*** -0.0540*** -0.0515***
(0.0154) (0.0137) (0.0126) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0117)
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105
R2 0.061 0.036 0.075 0.086 0.068 0.086
Durbin pval 0.0759 0.0233 0.0460 0.0265 0.0133 0.0459
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.16: Estimated average APC (%) from IV regressions in Table 1.15
Cutoff s.e. Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Top 5% Top 1%
5% 3.41 9.22 7.26 5.83 4.12 0.57 -2.88 -5.78
10% 3.59 9.36 7.34 5.84 4.05 0.31 -3.33 -6.39
15% 3.30 9.13 7.22 5.83 4.17 0.73 -2.60 -5.40
20% 3.21 9.05 7.18 5.82 4.21 0.87 -2.37 -5.08
25% 3.35 9.17 7.24 5.83 4.15 0.65 -2.74 -5.58
30% 3.21 9.05 7.18 5.82 4.21 0.87 -2.37 -5.08
Table 1.17: OLS Regression with Cash-Constrained Indicator
C/R
Full Sample Workers Retirees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log level log level log level
R -0.0311*** -0.0104*** -0.0240*** -0.00857*** -0.0357*** -0.0124***
(-17.48) (-11.28) (-10.66) (-8.55) (-13.84) (-8.23)
cashconstrained -0.00176 0.0101*** -0.0191** -0.0111 -0.00137 0.0116**
(-0.50) (2.84) (-2.37) (-1.36) (-0.30) (2.58)
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2169 2169 929 929 1240 1240
R2 0.1589 0.0934 0.1484 0.1137 0.1611 0.0813
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.18: IV Regression with Cash-Constrained Indicator
C/R
Full Sample Workers Retirees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log level log level log level
R -0.0527*** -0.0497*** -0.0536*** -0.0318*** -0.0479*** -0.0748*
(-4.75) (-3.42) (-3.92) (-3.32) (-3.00) (-1.81)
cashconstrained -0.0154** -0.0182 -0.0391*** -0.0341** -0.00839 -0.0295
(-2.03) (-1.61) (-3.06) (-2.43) (-0.81) (-1.05)
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2105 2105 894 894 1211 1211
R2 0.0869 . . . 0.1390 .
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.19: OLS Regression with Cash-Constrained Indicator for the
Full Sample, Workers and Retirees
Full Sample Workers Retirees
(1) (2) (3)
Current Consumption
R 20347.0*** 4517.7 27790.9***
(4.23) (0.55) (3.73)
R2 -1466.6*** -1669.8*** -854.9***
(-9.59) (-7.19) (-3.88)
cashconstrained ∗R -7556.5** -13292.3 -2847.8
(-2.02) (-1.63) (-0.72)
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
N 2169 929 1240
R2 0.2605 0.2340 0.2611
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Other Control Variables Yes Yes
N 2169 2169
R2 0.0987 0.1019
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 1.21: Instrument Net Resources with Private Wealth, Human
Wealth, and Net Taxes
C/R
(1) (2) (3)
Instrument R with W H T
R -0.00985*** -0.00955*** -0.00610***
(-10.25) (-2.94) (-3.94)
cashconstrained 0.0105*** 0.0107** 0.0131***
(2.95) (2.56) (3.58)
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
N 2169 2169 2169
R2 0.0933 0.0930 0.0842
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Other Control Variables Yes Yes
N 2169 2169
R2 0.0926 0.0964
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 1.23: Breakdown of the Household Resources
Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R 24516.7*** 23622.3*** 22699.4*** 21794.3***
(4.65) (4.47) (4.32) (4.13)
W ∗R -1503.3*** -1491.3***
(-6.64) (-6.59)
AL ∗R -25.28 -13.12
(-0.07) (-0.04)
AIL ∗R -1679.5*** -1668.3***
(-7.18) (-7.13)
H ∗R -2137.5*** -2128.9*** -1450.6** -1443.6**
(-2.92) (-2.91) (-1.98) (-1.97)
T ∗R 1707.8 1711.0 438.2 445.1
(1.27) (1.27) (0.33) (0.33)
cashconstrained ∗R -7543.3** -7653.2**
(-2.02) (-2.05)
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2169 2169 2169 2169
R2 0.2599 0.2613 0.2647 0.2662
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 1·1: Average Propensity to Consume on Resources
50
Figure 1·2: Histogram of Annualized Total Assets Return
(a) Full Histogram (b) Histogram with Return Ranged from -2 to 2
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Figure 1·3: Wealth Luck IV with 20% Threshold
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Figure 1·4: MPC out of Cash-on-Hand
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Figure 1·5: Breakdown of Borrowing Constrained Indicator
(a) Breakdown by Net Resource
Quintiles (b) Breakdown by Age Cohort
Figure 1·6: Comparison between Retirees and Workers
(a) Borrowing Constrained Indica-
tor
(b) Consumption to Cash-on-Hands
Ratio
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Figure 1·7: Average Propensity to Consume on Resources
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Figure 1·8: Breakdown of Private Wealth into Liquid Assets and Illiquid Assets
(a) Liquid Assets (b) Illiquid Assets
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Chapter 2
Is Uncle Sam Inducing the Elderly to
Retire?
2.1 Executive Summary
Many, if not most, baby boomers appear at risk of suffering a major de cline in their
living standard in retirement. With federal and state government finances far too
encumbered to significantly raise Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid benefits,
boomers must look to their own devices to rescue their retirements, namely, working
harder and longer. However, the incentive of boomers to earn more is significantly
limited by a plethora of explicit federal and state taxes and implicit taxes arising
from the loss of federal and state benefits as one earns more. Of particular concern
is Medicaid and Social Security’s complex earnings test and clawback of disability
benefits. This study measures the work disincentives confronting those age 50 to 79
from the entire array of explicit and implicit fiscal work disincentives. Specifically,
the paper runs older respondents in the Federal Reserve’s 2013 Survey of Consumer
Finances through The Fiscal Analyzer — a software tool designed, in part, to calculate
remaining lifetime marginal net tax rates.
We find that working longer, say an extra five years, can raise older workers’
sustainable living standards. But the impact is far smaller than suggested in the
literature, in large part because of high net taxation of labor earnings. We also find
that many baby boomers now face or will face high and, in very many cases, extremely
high work disincentives arising from the hodgepodge design of our fiscal system. A
third finding is that the marginal net tax rate associated with a significant in crease
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in earnings, say $20,000 per year, arising from taking a fulltime or parttime job
(which could be a second job) can, for many elderly, be dramatically higher than that
associated with earning a relatively small, say $1,000 per year, extra amount of money.
This is due to the various income thresholds in our fiscal system. We also examine
the elimination of all transfer program asset and income testing. This dramatically
lowers marginal net tax rates facing the poor. Another key finding is the enormous
dispersion in effective marginal remaining lifetime net tax rates facing seemingly
identical households, that is, households with the same age and resource level. Finally,
we find that traditional, currentyear (i.e., static) marginal tax calculations relating
this year’s extra taxes to this year’s extra income are woefully off target when it
comes to properly measuring the elderly’s disincentives to work.
Our findings suggest that Uncle Sam is, indeed, inducing the elderly to retire.
2.2 Introduction
Ten thousand baby boomers are retiring each day. Many, if not most, are either
poorly or very poorly prepared to finance retirements that may last longer than they
worked. One marker of this problem is the financial reliance of retirees on Social
Security. Social Security was designed to provide a basic floor to a retiree’s living
standard. But it provides at least 90% of financial support to over one-third of elderly
households, and almost two-thirds of older households receive at least half of their
income from Social Security.1
This heavy reliance on Social Security is not due to particularly generous levels of
Social Security benefits. Instead, it reflects the wide spread failure of retirees to save
for their retirements. One recent survey reports that 40% of baby boomers have no
retirement savings whatsoever.2 Data from the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances





equal just $537,225. Thirty-five percent of these households hold less than half of this
amount, and 21% hold less than one-fifth of this amount. These and other dismal
statistics hold dire implications for the economic well-being of baby boomers through
time. According to Munnell et al. (2013), over half of today’s workers, including
boomers who are now retiring, will be unable to maintain their living standards in
retirement.
In fact, the baby boomers’ retirements could well prove financially more stressful
than those of current retirees. This is a particularly dire possibility as the financial
condition of today’s fully retired generations is, itself, quite dire. In 2015, over one--
fifth of married or partnered retirees and almost half of single retirees received 90% or
more of their income from Social Security.3 In that year, half of married or partnered
retirees and three-quarters of single retirees received half or more of their income
from Social Security.4 Even those who initially have retirement savings are hardly
set. Poterba et al. (2012) report that over half of the elderly outlive their financial
assets.
The absolute level of income is another means to assess retirement finances.
Roughly half of those now over 65 have less than $25,000 in annual income.5 This
is remarkably low given that the current poverty threshold for a single person is
$11,800.6 The Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) adjusts the official poverty
measure for taxes, the value of food stamps and other in-kind benefits, the costs of
out-of-pocket medical spending, geographic differences in housing expenses, and other
factors. Based on this measure, one in seven people age 65 and older (15%) are poor
compared to one in ten under the official measure. The SPM poverty rate among the
3https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/.
4A caveat is in order. Andrew Biggs suggests that these Social Security estimates may over-







elderly is far higher for minorities - 28% for Hispanics and 22% for African Americans.
Why might baby boomers have a harder time financing their retirements than
today’s retirees? First, many baby boomers, particularly those with higher incomes,
can expect to live longer. Indeed, one study predicts a 10% increase in their length
of retirement.7 Second, boomers are likely, on a riskadjusted basis, to earn lower real
returns on their savings given the prevailing real interest rates. Today’s 30-year TIPS
(Treasury Inflation Protected Securities) yield is less than 100 basis points. In 1998,
when 30-year TIPS were first introduced, they yielded above 300 basis points.8
Third, thanks to the legislated increase in the full retirement age, many will
experience lower Social Security replacement rates. Fourth, the failure to index the
thresholds at which the first 50% and then 85% of Social Security benefits are subject
to federal income taxation means that a growing number of boomers will experience
an ever higher rate of Social Security benefit taxation. Indeed, these third and fourth
factors imply significantly lower long-run Social Security replacement rates over the
next 15 years. Ellis et al. (2014) foresee an almost 15% decline in the replacement
rate between now and 2030.9
Fifth, there are now extra Medicare premiums facing those with higher incomes.
Moreover, the thresholds at which these premiums take effect are also not inflation
indexed. Sixth, the Affordable Care Act included two new high-income Medicare
taxes. One levies an additional .9% tax on wage earnings above specified thresholds.
The other applies a 3.8% rate to asset income above the same thresholds. Again,
these thresholds are, by law, explicitly and intentionally not indexed to inflation.
Seventh, out-of-pocket health care costs as well as the cost of supple mental
health insurance (major medical) policies will likely continue to rise. These out--
of-pocket costs include increases in out-of-pocket Medicare Part B costs due to three
factors—higher Medicare premiums, higher Medicare Part B copayments, and health
7Ellis, Munnell, and Eschtruth (2014, figure 3.1 and table 3.1).
8https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/tags/series?t=30year\%3Btips.
9Ellis, Munnell, and Eschtruth (2014, figure 3.3).
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care costs of outpa tient care not covered by Medicare Part B.10 Indeed, rising out--
of-pocket Medicare costs are projected to absorb roughly 2% more of baby boomers’
Social Security benefit checks by 2030.11 Eighth, out-of-pocket copays and deductibles
for Medicare Part D, which covers prescription drug expenses, are also projected to
rise in real terms.12
Ninth, current retirees can rely to a far greater extent on defined-benefit pensions
than is the case for baby boomers. According to Form 5500 fillings, the US Depart-
ment of Labor indicates that since 1975, the num ber of participants in defined-benefit
pensions has been constant at around 40 million. This is true despite a near doubling
of total US employment.13 Meanwhile, participation in defined-contribution plans has
increased from 11.5 million in 1975 to 92 million in 2013.14 Instead, apart from Social
Security, baby boomers will be relying primarily on their 401(k) and other defined-
contribution retirement accounts. But participation in such retirement accounts has
been very disappointing. Only 67% of boomers have retirement accounts of any kind
and, as stated, many of those with retirement accounts have very low balances.15
Raising Social Security’s benefit levels significantly could alleviate the boomers’
financial plight, as well as that of many current poor and low-income elderly. But
Social Security is 32.2% underfunded, that is, it is in extremely difficult financial
straits.16 What about the rest of the government’s fiscal enterprise? Does it have the
10This is in addition to the prospect of having to face the high-income Medicare premium due to
inflation raising nominal, but not real incomes.






16According to table VIF1 in the 2016 Social Security Trustees Report, the system faces a $32
trillion fiscal gap over the infinite horizon. This is the difference between (a) the present value of
the system’s projected future benefit outlays, and (b) the sum of the present value of the system’s
projected future taxes and its current trust fund. The $32 trillion fiscal gap is 32.3% of the present
value of projected future Social Security taxes. Consequently, the Social Security system is 32.3%
underfinanced. Stated differently, it needs a 32.3% immediate and permanent tax hike to continue
paying promised benefits through time. Since such tax hikes appear unlikely in the current political
environment, the system seems to be in no position to raise its expenditures even further to help
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financial wherewithal to subsidize far higher Social Security benefits? The answer
is clearly no, according to estimates by Auerbach and Gale (2016), based on recent
Harris (2012) projections.17
If the boomers are short on regular assets, short on retirement-account assets,
short on defined-benefit pensions, short on Social Security benefits, long on explicit
and implicit taxes, and the government can’t help, boomers have but one option to
maintain their living standards—earn more by working more at their current jobs,
delaying their retirements, or returning to work if they have already retired.
This is far easier said than done. Hour constraints at their current jobs, age dis-
crimination, increasing preference for leisure, and health limitations are four major
factors that limit older workers’ abilities and desire to raise their earnings through
time. Older workers also experience age-related declines in productivity (see Kot-
likoff and Gokhale (1992)) and, where applicable, negative private-pension accrual
associated with ongoing work (see Kotlikoff and Wise (1989)).
Another major roadblock to higher earnings of older workers is government--
imposed work disincentives operating through the tax and transfer system, which
can limit the willingness of the elderly to work harder and longer. These work disin-
centives entail both explicit marginal taxation, such as FICA payroll taxes, implicit
taxation associated with the loss of government benefits, such as food stamps, and
increased premiums for such benefits as a result of increased earnings—for example,
the income-based premiums for Medicare Part B.
This paper studies labor-supply work disincentives facing the elderly. Specifically,
it measures the remaining lifetime marginal net tax rates of household heads and
spouses/partners ages 50 through 79 included in the 2013 Federal Reserve Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF). The analysis is comprehensive, incorporating all major
bail out the baby boom generation.
17Auerbach and Gale estimate that the infinite horizon fiscal gap for the entire federal government
is between 6 and 11% of GDP—between a third and more than half of government revenues, on an
annual basis, depending on which government forecast of medical spending growth one uses.
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federal and state explicit and implicit taxes that were in place in 2013.18 Of partic-
ular concern is the potentially huge perceived work disincentive facing those in their
early sixties associated with Social Security’s complex earnings test. We say “per-
ceived” because Social Security’s Adjustment of the Reduction Factor (ARF), which
occurs at full retirement age, largely undoes the earnings test’s work disincentive.
But perception of the ARF seems so limited that we assume here that it is ignored
completely.
2.2.1 Summarizing Our Methodology
Our methodology, at its core, is very simple. We run all SCF households through
The Fiscal Analyzer (TFA)—a detailed lifecycle consumption-smoothing program,
developed in Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Koehler (2016), which incorporates both bor-
rowing constraints and life span uncertainty. In the course of doing its consumption
smoothing, TFA determines how much each household can spend in present expected
value, where the term expected references averaging over different longevity outcomes
and spending encompasses all expenditures, including terminal bequests net of estate
taxes. Suppose, for example, that earning an extra $1,000 raises a household’s ex-
pected present value of lifetime spending by $700. In this case, the household faces a
30% marginal net tax rate.
In forming these remaining lifetime net tax rates, TFA incorporates all major
federal and state tax transfer programs. There are roughly 30 such programs, in-
cluding many one would not necessarily associate with the taxation of labor supply,
such as the corporate income tax, the estate tax, food stamps, and, as mentioned,
income-related Medicare Part B premiums. Measuring marginal net tax rates facing
workers from all major fiscal programs is a major departure from common practice.
Other studies of marginal labor taxation consider, at most, a subset of the universe
18The implicit taxation of labor earnings under Obamacare due to the loss in health insurance
premium subsidies and increase in premiums associated with higher income is not included in this
study.
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of fiscal programs such as the combination of the federal income and FICA payroll
taxes. But other fiscal policies can have even larger impacts on work incentives. An
example here is the potential dramatic loss in all Medicaid benefits by low-income
workers who earn too much extra money.19 In the extreme, “too much” can be as
little as one dollar.
Constructing remaining lifetime rather than current-year marginal net tax rates is
an innovation as well, but it is also theoretically appropriate. Households do not nec-
essarily spend discrete increments to their current earnings in the year they earn them.
Indeed, doing so would be inconsistent with the objective of consumption smoothing,
which includes financing spending in retirement. Instead, they spread/smooth extra
resources, potentially over all future years. Precisely how much more a household
spends immediately versus in the future depends not just on its preferences, but also
on borrowing constraints it may face over time. It also depends on the extent to
which the household can transform current saving into future spending. This trans-
formation process depends, of course, on asset-income taxation, which one would not
typically associate with the taxation of labor supply. Yet determining the present
expected value of extra spending arising from extra earnings, taking into account the
household’s consumption-smoothing preference20 and capacities to transform current
19We count Medicare and Medicaid at their government costs notwithstanding the potential for
providers to add on costs that participants do not receive or for participants not to value $1 of
benefits in these programs at $1 as discussed in Finkelstein et al. (2015).
20The precise nature of consumption smoothing depends on preferences. At present, we assume all
households wish to maintain a stable living standard per household member through time, where liv-
ing standard is defined as discretionary spending per effective adult with an adjustment for economies
in shared living. However, our methodology can accommodate any desired profile of relative con-
sumption by age. The inclusion of borrowing constraints leads to higher relative consumption by
age among those so constrained. We will, in future work, consider alternative assumption about
the desired age-consumption profile. Assuming that people wish, other things equal, to have lower
spending when old than when young would reduce the impact of asset-income taxation. This would
be particularly important for the rich who have relatively more assets. On the other hand, it may
be that the rich have relatively steeper age-consumption profiles. For purposes of this study, our
objective is to describe the fiscal system people face assuming they share the same intertemporal
preferences. This lets us isolate the impact of the fiscal system. We also assume that households
know their future labor earnings and asset returns, a simplification that we hope to relax in future
work.
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saving into future spending, produces precisely the theoretically appropriate weighted
average of year-specific marginal net taxes on labor supply.21
The third nonstandard feature of our analysis is the systematic incorporation of
survival outcomes. Households don’t live for sure for specific numbers of future years.
Instead, their members die at unpredictable dates. Thus, a 40-year-old single woman
whose maximum age of life is 100 has 60 different survival paths to consider. If the
40-year-old is married to another 40-year-old, the couple has 3,600 survival paths
to consider. TFA determines spending and net taxation along all such paths, and
its measure of the expected present value of future spending arising from additional
earnings weighs the spending along each survival path (e.g., the husband dies in five
years and the wife in 22 years) by the probability of that particular survival path. To
ensure that all resources are fully spent no matter the particular survival path, the
present value of terminal bequests net of estate taxes arising at the end of each path
is treated as spending. Moreover, any estate taxes associated with the gross bequests
are properly discounted and included as part of the household’s total expected present
value of remaining lifetime taxes.
2.2.2 Summarizing Our Findings
Our first set of findings concern the degree to which working an additional five years
would raise the elderly’s sustainable living standard. We find that if all elderly now
working were to continue to work for five more years, they would, on average, raise
their sustainable living standards (annual discretionary spending per household mem-
ber with an adjustment for economies in shared living) by roughly 5 to 8% de pending
on their age and position in the resource distribution. These figures can be consid-
erably lower for older elderly and considerably higher—as high as 13%—for younger
elderly.
21An example of a yearspecific marginal net tax on labor supply is the amount one can spend
exactly 20 years from now from earning an extra amount of money today, assuming all the extra
money was allocated solely to spending more in exactly 20 years.
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Turning to work disincentives, we find high median effective marginal net remain-
ing lifetime net tax rates for all elderly from 50 to 79, with the exception of elderly of
lesser means age 70 and above. For cohorts age 50–54, 55–59, 60–64, and 65–69, me-
dian net tax rates follow a common pattern. They are in the 30 to 40% range for the
lowest resource quintile rising to near or above 40% for the second and third quintile,
and close to or above 50% for the next two quintiles. Among the richest (measured by
resources—the sum of net worth plus human wealth) 5% and 1%, median marginal
net tax rates can exceed 60%.
We also examine the elimination of all transfer program asset and income testing.
This dramatically lowers marginal net tax rates facing the poor and lower-resource
households. The impact on higher-resource households is, as one would expect, con-
siderably smaller.
We also find an enormous dispersion in effective marginal net tax rates even hold-
ing fixed the level of household resources. For example, nearly one-fifth of elderly
in the lowest quintile face marginal net tax rates above 60%. Almost a quarter face
marginal net tax rates below 20%. In the top resource quintile, a full third of elderly
are in 60% or higher marginal net tax brackets, whereas 14% are in brackets below
40%.
The above-cited marginal net tax rate results are based on separately increas-
ing the household head’s and/or spouse/partner’s earnings by $1,000 for just one
year. But marginal net tax rates can be quite different, indeed, generally higher in
the context of earning more for longer periods of time. This is due to Medicare in-
come limits, Social Security earnings test limits, and Social Security income taxation
thresholds, all of which come into play if extra earnings are sufficiently high. For ex-
ample, increasing each elderly respondent’s earnings by $10,000 for 10 years produces
particularly high effective marginal net tax rates.
Consider, for example, the impact of this particular experiment on those age
62 through 65, 80% of whom are collecting Social Security benefits. Among the
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bottom-resource quintile in this sample, nearly two in five face marginal net tax
rates above 80%. Over half face marginal net tax rates above 50%. Among this
sample’s top-resource quintile, over 80% face marginal net tax rates above 50%, and
over half face rates above 60%. Many of these households face the earnings test,
which reduces benefits as an individual’s labor market earnings increase. In our
base specification, we assume that households perceive that the earnings test is a
pure tax on benefits, that is, that they ignore the increase in future benefits that
result. This seems reasonable, given the opacity and complexity of the Adjustment of
the Reduction Factor formula. If individuals do understand the future benefits that
result, their marginal tax rates would generally be lower, but still high. For example,
Social Security recipients between ages 62 and 65 (i.e., those who potentially face
the earnings test) in the middle quintile of the resource distribution would face a
lifetime marginal tax rate of 47.7% rather than 55.1%. However, it is also possible
that understanding that future Social Security benefits will increase raises lifetime
marginal tax rates because this will induce a loss of other, means-tested benefits,
notably Medicaid.
2.3 Literature Review
There are three types of prior studies that bear on our analysis. One type considers
the general nature of labor supply among the elderly. The second considers the
impact of policy changes on labor supply, and the third attempts direct measurement
of marginal tax rates.
Haider and Loughran (2010) use the Current Population Survey and the Health
and Retirement Study to provide a broad survey of the employment of the elderly,
which they define as those over age 64. The authors show that more educated,
wealthier, and healthier elderly people are the most likely to work. But even among
those who do work past age 64, employment is marked by voluntary or involuntary
limitations on hours worked and relatively low wages attributable to the relatively
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heavy concentration of elderly employment in services. The authors also find that a
disproportionate proportion of the working elderly are self-employed. This arguably
constitutes evidence for age discrimination.
Forman and Chen (2008) document the general long-term decline in labor force
participation of older men. This trend has reversed in recent years. The labor force
participation rate of those over age 55 is now 35%, up from 30% a quarter century
ago. Moreover, the BLS forecasts a 40% elderly participation rate by the early 2020s.
Unfortunately, this projected rise appears too little, too late, to fix the baby boomers’
retirement financing problem.
While our paper is perhaps the first to integrate the effects of the broad range
of fiscal programs on the incentives for work by the elderly, there have been signifi-
cant contributions estimating the impact of public-pension provisions on retirement
incentives and retirement, including Kotlikoff and Wise (1989). Arguably, the most
important is Gruber and Wise (1999), who compile analyses of the implicit tax rates
on individuals over age 55 imposed by the various publicpension provisions in several
leading economies (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States), including early
retirement provisions and delayed retirement credits. They find a wide variation in
incentives, with implicit tax rates at the early retirement age ranging from –1% (in
the United States) to 141% (in the Netherlands), and also find that there is a strong
negative relationship between the “tax force” to retire (the sum of implicit tax rates
between the early retirement age and age 69) and the labor force participation rate of
males ages 55–65. While these estimates of incentives are important, they do not in-
corporate the effects of other significant fiscal programs, which can have a substantial
additional impact on work incentives.
A number of other studies have examined how specific policies affect the labor
supply of the elderly. Haider and Loughran (2008) and Song and Manchester (2007)
reported that, starting in 2000, the elimination of the earnings test for those who
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were at or above full retirement age had little influence on the elderly’s labor supply.
Using HRS data, Johnson et al. (2003) showed that for an increase in health
insurance premiums of $1,000, men (women) ages 51 to 61 are less likely to retire
early by 0.17 (0.24) percentage points because of lack of retiree benefits. Thus, an
expanded Medicare program covering individuals above age 61 would increase the
retirement rate, although the impact is small.
Coile and Gruber (2007) analyzed the impact of two policies on the retirement rate.
Raising the ERA (early retirement age, 62 years old) and NRA (normal retirement
age, then 65 years old) by three years would, by their estimates, lead to a decrease in
the average retirement rate of 1 to 3 percentage points (varying because of different
assumptions in the model) for both men and women. Moving to a more generous
policy, say, a system with a common replacement rate of 60% at age 65, would
increase the average retirement rate by 2 to 3 percentage points.
Samwick (1998) estimated that the increase in pension coverage by 50% in the
postwar period resulted in a 5% increase in the retirement rate of those ages 50–70,
or 27% of the actual reduction of labor force participation. Munnell et al. (2008)
maintain that maincareer jobs are no longer the norm for one’s terminal job. This
suggests that lower wages in second-career jobs may be inducing earlier retirement
in the form of taking Social Security benefits early and then earning just up to the
point at which the earnings test comes into play. French and Jones (2011) use HRS
data to show that if the Medicare eligibility age were in creased from age 65 to 67,
workers ages 60 to 69 would work 0.074 more years on average; elimination of two
years of Social Security benefits would lead to an additional 0.076 years of work.
Our method of computing lifetime marginal net tax rates is to compare the in-
crease in the expected present value of spending with the increase in the expected
present value of future lifetime earnings. Many previous papers have adopted similar
concepts when calculating marginal tax rates, but without the detail or comprehen-
siveness of our forward-looking calculations, which incorporate the current and future
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effects of a broad range of tax and transfer programs.
Joines (1981) estimates current marginal federal income tax rates for the US tax
system, estimating increments of personal income tax liability using a tax schedule
inferred from taxes paid and income received by individuals in adjacent income classes.
This is unlike our approach in several respects, as we incorporate actual tax systems,
include transfer payments as well, and measure taxes and income over time, in present
values. Feldstein and Samwick (1992) develop a method similar to ours to calculate
lifetime marginal net tax rates associated with Social Security taxes and benefits,
estimating for different types of individuals (varying by income, age cohort, gender,
and marital status) the incremental net tax rate on additional labor earnings, in
present value. Our methodology extends such an approach to include a broad range
of tax and transfer programs, not just Social Security.
Romich (2006) uses data from residents of Wisconsin to calculate marginal tax
rates, considering both federal transfer programs like Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) and state programs, for example, the Homestead Credit, a housing
subsidy for low-income tax filers. Family spending on child care and rents are hypo-
thetical and the same for all families in this research, and calculations are based on
current net taxes and income.
The closest antecedents to this study are those by Gokhale and Kotlikoff (2002)
and Gokhale et al. (2002). Their methodology is largely similar to ours, but leaves
out alternative life-span paths and also is based on stylized, that is, hypothetical
households. They, too, report remarkably high marginal tax rates on labor supply
facing Americans at different levels of annual earnings. But since they are providing
illustrative calculations, they are not able to evaluate the dispersion in marginal net
tax rates.
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2.4 Methodology, Data, and Past and Future Earnings Im-
putations
The appendix to Auerbach et al. (2016) describes precisely how TFA makes its cal-
culations, but the basics of our approach can be captured in three equations.
2.4.1 Methodology
Equation 2.1 defines remaining lifetime resources, R, as
R = H +W (2.1)
where H, human wealth, is the present value of lifetime earnings and W is private
net wealth. The measure R constitutes the lifetime resources available before taxes
are paid or transfer payments are received.
Equation 2.2 defines remaining lifetime spending, S, as
S = R− T (2.2)
where T stands for the present value of remaining lifetime net taxes (taxes paid less
transfer payments received).
Equation 2.3 clarifies our calculation of a household’s remaining lifetime marginal
net tax rate, τ .
τ = 1−∆S/∆R = ∆T/∆R (2.3)
Note that equations 2.1 and 2.2 hold along any realized survival path since the
present value of realized spending has to equal the present value of realized resources
net of realized net taxes.22 Hence, each of the variables, R, T , and S can be viewed
as expected present values, that is, as weighted averages across all realized future
22Again, our treatment of the present value of bequests net of estate taxes as part of S and our
inclusion of the present value of estate taxes as part of T , ensures that all resources are either spent
by the household or paid to government. (If T is negative, which is certainly can be, the payment
to the government is negative.)
71
survival paths of the path-specific realized present values of the variables, with the
weights being the probability of the particular survival path occurring.
Formula 2.3 is quite general. It holds no matter the nature of the in crease in
labor earnings and, thus, human wealth, H. Consequently, we can just as easily use
TFA to calculate the marginal net tax rate when H rises, say, due to a $1,000 increase
in current-year earnings or a $20,000 increase in all current and future years earnings
until retirement.
2.4.2 Data
As mentioned, our primary data come from the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF). We also use all past waves of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to impute
past Social Security-covered earnings to our households as well as to project future
covered earnings.
Table 2.1 provides a count of our sample households by cohort and resource per-
centile. In total, we have 2,658 households with heads ages 50–79. As one would
expect, the majority are in the younger age groups. Only 254 are age 75–79. Our
percentile groups are formed using sample household population weights, and the
households are distributed to the different resource percentiles based on their ranking
across all SCF households, not just those 50–79. Note that the number of households
in the top 5% and top 1% categories are larger than one would expect based on a
nonstratified, random sample. But the SCF oversamples the rich.
The SCF provides the value of W, the household’s (i.e., household head’s and
spouse’s, if married) tangible wealth. All inputs from the 2013 survey are transformed
into 2015 dollars and all provisions of all fiscal systems are from 2015. The 2013 SCF
has 6,015 families.23 Appendix B in Auerbach et al. (2016) details our sample selection
and coding decisions. It makes clear that we attempted to include all observations
23Missing data are imputed randomly and presented in five different SCF data sets called impli-
cates. We report results only for the first implicate, but we have run our analysis with the other
implicates and found no significant differences in results. The time required to process all households
in the SCF for one implicate is roughly 16 hours.
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in the SCF. Unfortunately, the SCF data does not include state identifiers. We may,
in future work, randomly assign households to different states. But in this study we
assume that all SCF respondents reside in Ohio, which is unexceptional in terms of
its state tax system and tax rates.
A key component of our calculations involving saving and wealth is the before-tax
rate of return on household saving. For this, we use the average return on wealth for
the period 1948–2015 based on data from the National Income and Product (NIPA)
accounts and the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds data. The numerator for each year
equals the share of national income not going to wages and salaries (including the
portion of proprietors’ income we impute to labor). The denominator is aggregate
wealth of the household sector plus financial wealth (negative if a net liability) of the
federal, state, and local government sectors. The resulting average real before-tax
rate of return is 6.371%. To calculate nominal rates of return, we assume an inflation
rate of 2%.
2.4.3 Imputing Future and Past Labor Income
To form H, the present expected value of future labor earnings, we need to forecast,
for each individual, a trajectory of future labor earnings. In addition, we need to
“backcast” past earnings in order to calculate Social Security-covered earnings, which
enter into the calculation of future Social Security benefits.
In forecasting and backcasting labor earnings, we statistically match Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS) households to SCF households. In particular, we define cells
in each wave of the CPS by age, sex, and education,24 and use successive waves to
estimate annual earnings growth rates by age and year for individuals in each sex and
education cell. These cell growth rates are used to backcast each individual’s earnings
history. We also project future earnings for each particular cell defined by age and
demographic group until age 67 (when we assume individuals claim retirement ben-
24In cases where cells have fewer than 25 observations, we merge cells for adjoining ages and
assume that average growth rates for these merged cells hold for all included ages.
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efits) by using average historical growth rates by age, net of average overall earnings
growth, and plus an assumed future annual general real growth rate of 1%.25
These past and future growth-rate estimates are for cell aggregates and do not
account for earnings heterogeneity within cells. To deal with such heterogeneity, we
assume that observed individual deviations in earnings from cell means are partially
permanent and partially transitory, based on an underlying earnings process in which
the permanent component (relative to group trend growth) evolves as a random walk
and the transitory component is serially uncorrelated. We also assume that such
within-cell heterogeneity begins in the first year of labor force participation.
In particular, suppose that, at each age, for group i, earnings for each individual j
evolve (relative to the change in the average for the group) according to a shock that
includes a permanent component, p, and an i.i.d temporary component, e. Then,
at age a (normalized so that age 0 is the first year of labor force participation),
the within-group variance will beaσ2p + σ
2
e . Hence, our estimate of the fraction of





e). This share grows with age as permanent shocks accu-
mulate. Using this estimate, we form the permanent component of current earnings



















and assume that future earnings grow at the group average growth rate.26 Further, we
make the simplifying assumption that the permanent and temporary earnings shocks
have the same variance, a reasonable one based on the literature (e.g., Moffitt and
25The appendix to Auerbach et al. (2016) provides full details of our use of the CPS data in
forming our backcasts and forecasts.
26Because we ignore earnings uncertainty in our calculations, we set all future permanent and
temporary shocks to zero.
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For backcasting, we assume that earnings for individual j were at the group mean
at age 0 (i.e., the year of labor force entry), and diverged smoothly from this group


















That is, for each age we use a weighted average of the estimate of current permanent
earnings, deflated by general wage growth for group i, and the estimated age-a group-
i mean also deflated by general wage growth for group i, with the weights converging
linearly so that as we go back we weight the group mean more and more heavily, with
a weight of 1 at the initial age, which we assume is age 20.
2.4.4 Intended and Imputed Ages of Retirement and Social Security Col-
lection in the SCF
Table 2.2 provides the distribution of retirement ages specified in our data for the
different age cohorts. In forming this table and producing our results, we use re-
spondents’ stated retirement ages and assume they stop working entirely thereafter.
For those who say they will never retire, we set their retirement age to the larger of
(a) their current age plus three years, and (b) age 70. All working respondents are
required by the SCF to answer the survey’s question concerning their intended age
of retirement. A relatively high share of the sample’s individuals was already retired
at the time they were interviewed by the SCF. Among those still working, a remark-
ably small share specify ages 62 or 66 for the ages at which they will retire. Indeed,
among those between 50 and 59 who are still working, over half say they will either
retire at or after age 70 or never retire. Either the respondents chose not to take this
question seriously or they have, as a group, highly unrealistic expectations about how
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long they will be able or want to work. This may help explain why so many baby
boomers appear so poorly financially prepared for retirement. Nonetheless, we use re-
spondents’ projected retirement age to specify, as indicated above, when respondents
entirely stop earning money.
Unfortunately, the SCF does not ask respondents their intended dates for collect-
ing their Social Security retirement benefits. As a result, we need to impute these
dates. Our method is very simple. For each individual, we set the age of retirement
benefit collection at the actual or imputed retirement age, or age 70 if the actual or
imputed retirement age is later. We also set the ages for collection of spousal bene-
fits and widows’ benefits at the respondent’s full retirement age. Unfortunately, the
public-use SCF sample does not tell us if single respondents are divorced, widowed,
or never married. As we have no information on the former spouse in the case of
divorcees (whose ex may or may not be alive) or the decedent spouse in the case of
widows, we are forced, in this study, to treat all single respondents as never mar-
ried. We do assume that married spouses file for their spousal benefits starting at
full retirement age and that married spouses who become widowed start receiving
their widow’s benefit at full retirement age. These collection ages are then subject to
override by Social Security’s deeming provisions.27
The SCF can be used to determine the ages that respondents who are already col-
lecting first began collecting their retirement benefits. Table 2.3 presents these data.
Note that almost half of respondents report taking their retirement benefit as soon as
it became available, at age 62. Almost one-quarter took it at 65. All told, over 90%
of respondents receiving Social Security took their retirement benefit at or below the
current full retirement age, 66, and, obviously, well before age 70. This appears to be
due, in part, to the inability of households to make it financially to 70 without Social
Security. This liquidity constraint can, itself, reflect a decision by such households to
27For example, a couple who are both 55-year-olds in 2013 and indicate that they will take their
retirement benefits at 70 will, under the assumption that they both take their spousal benefit at 66,
be forced to take their retirement benefit at 66 as well. This reduces or raises their lifetime benefits
depending on their relative sizes and absolute levels of past covered earnings.
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stop working because they believe that, due to the earnings test, it doesn’t pay. This
assumes, of course, that they are unaware of the Adjustment of the Reduction Factor.
Another explanation is that older Americans do not appreciate longevity risk and,
instead, assume they will die “on time” (i.e., at their life expectancies) or earlier. As
a result, they can easily undervalue the far higher benefits available from waiting to
collect benefits at higher ages.
2.4.5 Projecting Mortality
A key element of our calculations is uncertain lifetimes, based on assumed mortality
probabilities that vary by age, sex, and, of particular relevance for our calculations,
the level of resources. We utilize estimates from the recent study by the National
Academies of Sciences et al. (2015), which modeled mortality as a function of age,
sex, birth year, and income quintile, where income was measured using a truncated
AIME calculation based on earnings between ages 40 and 50 and the variable for
couples was set equal to the sum of spouses’ truncated AIME divided by the square
root of 2.28 We follow the same procedure to sort households to determine their
quintile for purposes of assigning mortality profiles, except that we use a full AIME
measure, imputed to age 60 in cases where individuals have only partial earnings
records. Mortality is assumed to begin starting at age 55.
Note that the resource definition used for assigning mortality profiles is different
from that used in our analysis below, for example, not including wealth and being
based on average earnings until age 60, rather than resources as of the individual’s
current age. However, there should be considerable overlap between the two methods
of classification.
28We are grateful to Bryan Tysinger for providing the code for these calculations.
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2.5 Federal and State Fiscal Institutions
Table 2.4 lists the roughly 30 different fiscal institutions included in our analysis.
The major elements in the table that concern the elderly are the federal personal in-
come tax, Ohio’s state income tax, Ohio’s sales tax, the federal corporate income tax,
the FICA tax, Social Security benefits, Medicaid benefits, Medicare benefits, Medi-
care Part B premiums, food stamps, Supplemental Security Income, and disability
benefits.29
As the table shows, the federal personal income tax has many components that
separately influence the rate of marginal net taxation. These components include
progressive tax rates, the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Alternative Minimum Tax,
preferential taxation of capital gains and dividends, the taxation of Social Security
benefits, Medicare’s new high-income payroll and asset-income taxes, and the phase-
out of deductions and exemptions.
Figure 2·1 shows a breakdown of average lifetime resources, taxes, and transfer
payments by resource quintile. The 4th quintile, for example, references all house-
holds ranked from 61st to 80th in the distribution of remaining lifetime resources
(the present value of remaining lifetime earnings plus household net wealth). All
observations are pooled in this figure. The appendix (http://www.nber.org/data-
appendix/c13866/ appendix c13866.pdf) presents comparable figures, but for the spe-
cific cohorts. Figure 1 shows the relative and absolute importance of different types
of assets and sources of income in determining overall resources. It does the same
for the components of taxes and transfer payments. What we see is largely what we
expect. Here are five examples. First, a disproportionate share of the assets of the
29We ignore housing subsidies, which are also income tested, because based on our understanding
subsidized apartments and other forms of housing subsidies are limited in number and are allocated
on a waiting-line basis. While the incidence of the corporate income tax may fall on workers to a
large extent, the corporate income tax represents a marginal tax assessed on additional asset income
since any given worker’s additional saving (arising from additional earnings) will entail receiving a
lower return due to the corporate tax, but that worker’s work and saving responses to the tax will
be too small to influence the system’s overall incidence.
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top 20% is represented by regular assets as opposed to retirement accounts or home
equity. Second, the poorest 20% of households have dramatically lower assets, on
average, than households in other cohorts. Third, self-employment income is partic-
ularly important for the top quintile. Fourth, federal income taxes matter far more
for higher-resource quintiles. And fifth, Social Security and Medicare benefits are the
major transfer payments for all resource quintiles, with Medicaid benefits also playing
a significant role for the poor.
Although figure 2·1 tells us about averages in the data developed and used in
this study, it does not directly bear on the main question of this study—the size of
marginal effective remaining lifetime net tax rates. The reason is simply that our tax
and transfer system is highly nonlinear. Consequently, a tax or transfer that is quite
small, on average, can have a huge impact on marginal work incentives.
2.5.1 Social Security’s Earnings Test
Of particular interest and concern when it comes to the elderly’s incentives to work
is Social Security’s earnings test. For those who file for their Social Security benefits
early (before full retirement age, currently 66), which represents roughly over three--
quarters of retirees, the earnings test can increase their effective marginal net tax rate
by up to 50 percentage points.
We say “can” for four reasons. First, during the year one reaches full retirement
age benefits are reduced 33¢, not 50¢ for each additional dollar earned, and only
through the day one reaches full retirement age. Second, earnings have to exceed an
exempt amount before they trigger benefit cuts. The 2016 annual exempt amounts
were $15,720 for those between age 62 and January 1st of the year they will reach
full retirement age, and $41,880 between January 1st of the year they will reach full
retirement age and the day they reach full retirement age.
Third, Social Security’s Adjustment of the Reduction Factor, if understood, un-
does the labor supply tax associated with the earnings test. It does so at full retire-
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ment age by raising all of the specific type of benefits lost under the earnings test to
fully offset, on an actuarial basis, the earnings test’s confiscation of those benefits.
Indeed, those earning enough to lose all their benefits in a given year may face no
marginal taxation from the clawback of Social Security benefits.
Fourth, for those who understand Social Security’s Adjustment of the Reduction
Factor (ARF) provision, the clawback may, thus, only be temporary. We emphasize
the world “may” for two reasons. First, for households that are borrowing constrained,
but do understand the Adjustment of the Reduction Factor, the value of receiving
higher benefits in the future will not fully offset the loss of benefits now as the marginal
utility of consumption in the present exceeds that in the future. Second, the ARF
only raises the specific benefit that was lost due to the earnings test. For those who
will receive a different benefit after full retirement age (e.g., a widow’s benefit rather
than a retirement benefit) having a higher benefit that one is not actually receiving
is of no avail to those who were hit by the earnings test.30
The ARF is, however, sufficiently complex that very few workers subject to the
earnings test appear to understand it. As a consequence, many workers who take
Social Security early and are subject to the earnings test may perceive they are
facing either a 50% or a 33% marginal Social Security tax when, in fact, their effective
marginal tax arising from the earnings test is zero. This concern about misperception
of the earnings test is supported by the propensity of workers potentially subject to
the earnings test to bunch their earnings at or just below the earnings test exempt
amounts.31
Workers can, of course, avoid the earnings test entirely by simply waiting until
30One additional factor in our calculations is that the ARF is not actuarially fair on a discounted
present value basis, given the before-tax rate of return used in our calculations. The ARF is based on
an underlying roughly 3% real return. But our TFA model uses the average return on assets in the
economy in the postwar period, which as discussed in Auerbach et al. (2016), is 6.371%. This return
has been remarkably stable, exhibiting a standard deviation of just .49%. The fact that the real
pretax return to assets is over twice the 3% used to form the ARF means that, in our calculations,
the ARF offsets somewhat less than half of the earnings test, even assuming that it is correctly
perceived by workers (i.e., that the fourth caveat raised above does not hold).
31See Friedberg (2000).
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full retirement age to file for their benefits. But doing so raises another question of
perception. Many workers who become eligible for Social Security may not realize
that waiting to collect their benefits will fully, indeed, in most cases, more than fully
compensate them for foregoing benefits in the short run. They may not be aware or
understand the actuarial adjustments associated with waiting to collect. They may
not realize that the higher benefits from waiting are real not nominal, that is, they
are above and beyond future adjustments for inflation. And they may not understand
the nature of actuarial calculations. In this regard, many workers appear to focus
on their life expectancy, not their maximum age of death in considering their future
longevity.
Social Security encourages this behavior by referencing life expectancy in different
parts of its website and by providing a life expectancy calculator on their website.32
For those convinced they will die at their life expectancy, waiting to collect a higher
benefit will be perceived as actuarially unfair even when it is fair or more than fair.
This misperception will lead workers to take their benefits as soon as possible, at which
point the complete or partial misperception of the ARF coupled with misperception of
the AFR’s real actuarial adjustments can leave workers in 33 to 50% higher perceived
marginal tax brackets. Marginal tax rates of 33 to 50% represent a significant work
disincentive on their own, but they come on top of other explicit and implicit marginal
taxes.
In our basic calculations we assume that the elderly do not understand the AFR
and we do not, therefore, incorporate it in our results. We do, however, show the
sensitivity of our results to this assumption and, thereby, the potential impact of the
earnings test on work disincentives.
32www.ssa.gov/planners/lifeexpectancy.html.
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2.6 How Much Can The Elderly Raise Their Living Stan-
dards By Working More?
As a starting point for our analysis, we note the findings of Butrica et al. (2006),
who use the Urban Institute’s Dynamic Simulation of Income Model (DYNASIM)
to study the financial impact of the elderly’s working longer.33 Their study suggests
that workers’ living standards can be raised by over 50% based on just five additional
years of work from age 50 onward. To quote their study:
Workers, according to DYNASIM3, could increase their annual income by an average of
5% from age 50 onward for one additional year of work, and 25% for five additional years
of work.
If these findings are accurate, policies that discourage work by the elderly would be
of far greater concern than many analysts, including us, have assumed. Consequently,
we felt it important to repeat their analysis. Our results are shown in tables 2.5 and
2.6. The sample used in these tables encompasses those age 50–79 who are currently
working. In the exercise, we extend the retirement age of both the household head
and spouse/partner by either one or five years and assume workers earn the amounts
projected based on our above-described method. Even though many, if not most,
respondents do not likely understand the ARF, we include it in our analysis since
the household will end up with this extra income and our goal here is to understand
all the returns from working. The tables include working single households as well
as households with couples where at least one spouse/partner is working. Hence, the
weighted average percentage increase in lifetime spending reflects only what working
households can expect, on average, if they postpone their retirements. For all house-
33DYNASIM, the tool that Butrica et al. (2006) uses, ages a starting self-weighting sample of
about 100,000 individuals from the 1990 to 1993 Survey of Income and Program Participation in
yearly increments to 2050. Parameters in DYNASIM are estimated from longitudinal data sources.
DYNASIM can project retirement age and Social Security takeup age, and simulate major sources
of retirement income like SS benefits and pension income.
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holds, including nonworking households, in any given cell the percentage increase in
spending will be smaller.
Among those ages 60–64, the percentage gain for working five years more is 15.7%
for those in the lowest quintile, 10.0% for those in the third quintile, 7.6% for those
in the top quintile, and 5.1% for those in the top 1%. The corresponding figures for
all households (not just those with at least one worker) are 8.1%, 7.9%, 6.4%, and
3.8%.
In the case of a one-year retirement extension, the results for the 60–64 year-old
cohort for the same four percentile groups are 6.2%, 2.6%, 1.9%, and 1.2%. The
percentage increases averaged across all households in this cohort are 3.2%, 2.1%,
1.6%, and .9%.
If we consider a younger cohort, those age 50–54, the results from working five
additional years for the lowest, middle, and highest quintiles and the top 1% are 8.9%,
9.7%, 8.2%, and 7.7% among working households. Since most households in this age
range are working, the results averaged across all households are not much smaller.
These percentage increases, even considering just working households, are much
smaller than Butrica et al. (2006) report. Indeed, across all cells in tables 2.5 and
2.6, the largest percentage increase in the remaining lifetime discretionary spending
is 20.0% for the lowest quintile in the age 70–74 cohort. Part of the reconciliation in
the two sets of results is that Butrica et al. (2006) are considering gross income, not
net income or discretionary spending. Discretionary spending is, of course, financed
out of net remaining lifetime resources. This would make their percentage changes
larger than ours. Another reason their changes should be larger is that discretionary
spending is financed, in part, out of household assets, both regular and retirement
account assets. Consequently, any given percentage change in labor earnings should
have a smaller percentage impact on discretionary spending to the extent that the
household has assets. This also explains why our percentage changes in discretionary
spending are lower for cohorts in higher resource percentiles. A third reason for why
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we are finding a smaller percentage change in living standard is our inclusion of all
transfer payments. The fourth and probably most important reason for the differences
in results is that Butrica et al. (2006) assume that all extra funds earned are saved
through retirement and then used to purchase an annuity.34
2.7 The Elderly’s Rates of Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net
Taxation
We first consider median remaining lifetime marginal net tax rates arising from a
$1,000 increase in current-year earnings. This is on top of our baseline projection of
future earnings for the workers. Table 2.7 shows the results by resource quintile and
the top 5 and top 1 percentiles for the entire sample, as well as for specific cohorts.
These and all other medians were constructed taking into account SCF household
sample weights.
The median rates in most cells are remarkably high. Take, for example, those age
55–59 in the third resource quintile. Their median marginal net tax rate is 46.2%,
meaning that half those in this cell face even greater work disincentives. Or, consider
those age 70–74 in the highest quintile; their median marginal net rate is 57.6%. At
the very top end of the resource distribution, median rates exceed 60% for all age
groups except the oldest. The basic pattern of median rates rising with resources
holds for all age groups except those 75–79, where there is a significant drop in going
from the first to the second quintile, but with median rates rising thereafter for higher
resource groups.
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 repeat Table 2.6’s exercise, except their increments to current-
year earnings are $10,000 and $20,000, respectively.35 These larger earnings incre-
ments incur higher median marginal net tax rates. For example, the just-mentioned
age 55–59 third quintile median marginal net rate is 49.3% in table 2.9 compared to
34Presumably a nominal annuity will be front-loaded in terms of its impact on consumption, given
the fact that inflation will erode the future purchasing power of the annuity.
35Again, these earnings are in addition to baseline projected future earnings.
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46.2% in table 2.7, and the top 1% of those 75–79 have a 64.2% median marginal rate
in table 9 compared with a 59.3% median rate in table 2.7.
These particular cell differences are small, but for other cells the differences in
marginal net taxation from a $1,000 increase in current earnings versus a $20,000
increase can be major. Take, for instance, the lowest age 50–54 quintile. Its median
marginal net tax rate is 38.0% in the case of a $1,000 earnings increment and 77.4% in
the case of a $20,000 earnings increment. This reflects the loss of the poor’s Medicaid
benefits associated with earning so much more. Loss of Medicaid also plays a role
in raising the median rate of 32.7% for those in the lowest quintile ages 60–64, aris
ing from a $1,000 increment to current earnings to 82.5%, arising from a $20,000
increment. But the earnings test also comes into play for many respondents between
62 and 64 who are collecting Social Security because it puts them above the threshold
at which the earnings test’s 50% marginal rate comes into play. Figures 2 and 3, which
consider $1,000 and $20,000 earnings increments lasting for one year, provide a good
snapshot of the level of median marginal net tax rates facing all those age 50–79.
Table 2.10 considers the same increments to earnings, but lasting not one year,
rather through retirement. Here again we consider median marginal net tax rates,
but to economize on space, we group all age groups together. The table shows that
for those in the lowest quintile, the median marginal net tax rate can be dramatically
higher depending on the length of time the higher earnings continue. For example,
a $10,000 increase for one year produces a median net tax rate of 40.8%. But the
same $10,000 increase, if extended through retirement, produces an 82.5% marginal
net rate! And this prohibitively high rate is just the median, meaning that half of
the elderly in the lowest quintile lost more than 82.5 cents on the dollar were they to
earn an extra $10,000 through retirement!
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2.7.1 Marginal Net Taxation Facing Social Security Recipients
For Social Security recipients, the tax rates embodied in the Social Security system’s
rules are of paramount importance. As already discussed, though, these rules are
both complex and poorly explained, meaning that the impact on work and retirement
incentives depends very much on how these rules are perceived.
To illustrate the importance of these perceptions, table 2.11 provides alternative
estimates of median lifetime tax rates exclusively for Social Security recipients, ages
62–65 (individuals who could face the earnings test by earning additional current
labor income). The first three columns of the table repeat the calculations from
tables 2.7-2.9 for Social Security recipients. The remaining three columns provide
marginal tax rates under the alternative assumption that individuals correctly per-
ceive how ARF works. As one would expect, estimated marginal tax rates generally
decline with this assumption, as individuals understand that losing current benefits
through the earnings test is in good part offset by earning higher future benefits.
For example, those in the middle quintile earning an additional $20,000 in the
current year would face a median marginal tax rate of 55.1% if ARF is not taken
into account, but 47.7% if ARF is correctly understood. What is initially surprising,
though, is that marginal tax rates may increase when the effects of ARF are included
in the calculation. This can be seen by comparing marginal tax rates for those in
the lowest quintile earning an additional $20,000, whose median marginal tax rate
rises from 74.7% to 77.2%. Such low-resource individuals can face higher marginal
net tax rates from earning extra income with the ARF turned on and assumed to be
fully understood because the extra ARF income leaves them (prior to earning more
money) close to Medicaid and other means-tested, transfer-payment thresholds.
As discussed (see fn. 28), the ARF, though conceived to provide an actuarial
offset to the earnings test, will provide only a partial offset to the extent that actual
rates of return exceed those on which the ARF adjustment is based, as is the case
for our assumed rate of return. As an alternative, one can consider the impact of
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simply eliminating the earnings test, which is an equivalent—in present value—to an
exact actuarial offset, including one that would take into account differential mortality
across income groups.
Table 2.12 provides estimates of marginal tax rates for Social Security recipients
ages 62–65 for our base case (with no ARF) and under the assumption that the
earnings test is eliminated. The first three columns of the table repeat those in table
11, and the last three columns show median marginal tax rates assuming the earnings
test is eliminated. These columns can be compared to the corresponding columns
of table 11 to see how much of a difference the alternative assumptions about the
earnings test (ARF vs. elimination) make.
In making this comparison, it is important to keep in mind that while both ARF
and eliminating the earnings test increase the present value of resources, relative to
an earnings test without ARF, the timing of their adjustments differs. ARF offsets
the current reduction in benefits caused by the earnings test with an increase in fu-
ture benefits, while eliminating the earnings test simply increases current benefits.
This difference is what underlies the big difference in median marginal tax rates for
the lowest-income quintile earning an additional $20,000 in the current year. While
ARF actually increases the perceived marginal tax rate (as discussed above), elimi-
nating the earnings test reduces the marginal tax rate from 74.7% to 54.7% because
individuals in this group will be much less subject to increased future benefit loss.
For higher-resource groups, benefit phase-outs are less important; for these groups,
eliminating the earnings test typically reduces median tax rates slightly more than
incorporating ARF, because by our assumptions the ARF is not fully actuarially
fair. For example, individuals in the highest quintile earning an additional $20,000
experience a decline in their median marginal tax rate from 66.8% to 59.4% under
elimination of the earnings test, but to 61.8% when including the ARF.
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2.7.2 The Impact of Eliminating All Income and Asset Tests of Transfer
Programs
Table 2.13 shows how marginal net tax rates would look were all income and as-
sets tests of all transfer programs jointly eliminated. The table considers a one-year
$20,000 increase in earnings and can be directly compared with table 9.
As one would expect, median rates are dramatically lower for poor and lower--
income households. For example, take the cohort age 50–54. The first quintile median
marginal net tax rate is 77.4% with the transfer program marginal taxation included
(i.e., as reported in table 2.9). It is 31.5% without (as reported in table 2.13). For the
third quintile in this cohort, the two rates are 47.4% and 41.1%. Or, consider those
ages 60–64. The first quintile’s table 2.9 median rate is 82.5%, but it is only 27.6%
in table 2.13. For those in this age range in the third quintile, the median rate falls
from 47.0% to 39.2%.
2.7.3 The Dispersion of Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates
Figure 2·4 and table 2.14 show the remarkable dispersion of remaining marginal net
tax rates across all SCF sample respondents (i.e., household heads and, where ap-
plicable, their spouses or partners) ages 50 to 79. The figure and table consider the
marginal lifetime net tax rates arising from a $20,000 increase in earnings for one year.
The figure and table are limited to observations with marginal tax rates ranging from
zero to 200%. Dispersion results for other hypothetical increases in earnings lasting
one or more years are quite similar. Note from the figure that most of the very high
marginal net tax rates are those of respondents who are collecting either Medicaid
benefits, Social Security benefits, or both.
The fact that the median remaining lifetime net tax rates range from high to
very high may be expected given the seemingly independent design of so many tax
systems and subsystems as well as so many transfer payments programs, all of which
incorporate implicit tax schedules through the income testing of the benefits they pro-
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vide. But what we find remarkably surprising is the enormous variation in marginal
net tax rates among households within the same cohort and quintile of the resource
distribution.
Cohort-specific tables in the appendix show that the dispersion holds within each
age group, but the dispersion tends to be much greater at lower resource levels.
Anyone familiar with optimal tax theory would likely view the dispersion in marginal
net tax rates displayed in figure 2·4 with chagrin. It appears to be strongly at odds
with what that body of theory recommends. In particular, it does not recommend
net tax rates so high as to effectively lock large numbers of older workers, particularly
the poor and the rich, out of the work force.
Consider, for example, the implications for those age 60–64 earning $20,000 more
for one year. Among the lowest quintile, 51% will lose more than 80 cents of every
extra dollar earned, 8% will lose between 61 and 80 cents, and 7% will lose between
51 and 60 cents. Hence, two-thirds of the poorest members of this cohort that face
marginal net tax rates above 50% and over half face marginal net tax rates above 80%.
Among those in the top quintile, 39% are in a 61 to 80% marginal net tax bracket
and 33% are in a 51 to 60% marginal net tax bracket. Hence, almost three-quarters
are in marginal net tax brackets that exceed 50%.
Very high marginal net taxation holds for a significant minority of the poor of all
cohorts. It is also present for many of the upper-middle class and the rich—at all
ages. For example, take those age 70–74. Sixty-five percent of those in the fourth
quintile face a marginal net tax rate between 51 and 60% on earnings of $20,000 in
the current year. In the top quintile of this cohort, 83% lose more than half the
additional $20,000, and almost half lose between 61% and 80%.
2.7.4 Maximum and Minimum Marginal Net Tax Rates
Another way to assess the variance in marginal net tax rates is to consider the max-
imum and minimum rates. Tables 15 and 16 present these values again for the case
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of a one-year, $20,000 increase in earnings. The highest rate recorded in table 14,
which presents maximums, is 627.9%. This for a respondent whose household is in
the lowest-resource quintile in the cohort 65–69.
Table 2.16’s minimum marginal net tax rates are far smaller, but many of the
figures are still fairly high. For example, in the top quintile of those age 55–59, the
lowest rate is 32.5%. The table’s lowest rate is 8.8%—the minimum marginal net tax
rates for the lowest quintiles ages 50–54, as well as 65–69. Thus, in the case of the
poorest 65–69-year-olds, the marginal net tax rates range from 8.8% to 627.9%—quite
a range!
The household with a marginal lifetime net tax rate of 8.8% is a single woman, age
66, with a young child (age five) in her care. Her primary source of income is Social
Security, but she also receives food stamps and Supplemental Security Income. She
owns a modest home and has a small mortgage. The low marginal tax rate she faces
is due to her having the child in her home. If she earns an additional $20,000 in the
current year, her federal taxes will decrease. Indeed, she will receive a federal income
tax refund due to the Child Tax Credit and the Earned Income Tax Credit. Her food
stamp benefits will, however, be reduced in the current year but that is more than
offset by the refund, leaving her with a small positive marginal net tax rate.
The household with the marginal lifetime net tax rate of 627.9% is a married couple
whose husband is age 65 and wife is age 61. The husband is currently collecting Social
Security and has modest self-employed income of roughly $8,000 per year. The wife
is disabled and receives Social Security Disability Income. They own a modest home
with no mortgage. Their high marginal tax rate is due to the loss of their Medicaid
benefits in the years prior to the wife reaching age 65. The additional $20,000 in the
current year increases their Modified Adjusted Gross Income, which determines their
Medicaid eligibility. The additional labor earnings in the current year eliminate their
current-year Medicaid eligibility. But, since they save a portion of the additional
income and, as a result, have more assets in asset income, after the first year, they
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also lose Medicaid eligibility in future years. Indeed, they lose it for four years in a
row.
2.7.5 Comparing Current and Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Tax
Rates
Table 2.17 presents current-year marginal net tax rates defined as the change in this
year’s net taxes divided by the increment to earnings—$1,000 in this case. The figures
in this table should be compared with those in table 2.7, reproduced here in bold font,
which also consider a one-year, $1,000 rise in labor earnings, but take into account
that households smooth their consumption over time. Accordingly, the present values
of their net taxes exceed what they pay in the current year.
The differences are strikingly large. Consider the 31.6% median lifetime marginal
net tax rate for the lowest quintile age 50–79 (in bold font). This is over twice the
14.8% median current year net tax rate (in normal font). Or, take those age 60–64 in
the third quintile. Their remaining lifetime marginal net tax rate, in bold, is 41.6%,
but their current-year marginal net tax rate is only 31.1%. A third example is the
richest 1% of those ages 70–74. Their median remaining lifetime marginal net tax
rate is 67.4%, far higher than the 43.6% rate current-year net tax rate.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the marginal net taxation of the
elderly by running observations from the 2013 Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) through The Fiscal Analyzer, a lifecycle consumption-smoothing pro-
gram specially designed to incorporate all major federal and state fiscal programs
including the federal corporate income tax, personal federal and state income taxes,
FICA taxes, state sales taxes, estate taxes, Social Security benefits, Social Secu-
rity’s earnings test, food stamps, Social Security disability benefits, Medicare benefits,
Medicare Part B premiums, and Medicaid benefits.
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Our findings show that older workers typically face high, very high, or remarkably
high marginal net taxation on their extra earnings. Work disincentives are largest for
those at the bottom and top ends of the resource distribution. The disincentives are
also highly nonlinear; the marginal net tax rate facing those earning an extra $20,000
in the current year and those earning an extra $1,000 can be dramatic.
Another central finding is that the marginal net tax on earning any given amount,
but for a longer period of time, is no higher than earning extra money over a shorter
period of time. Finally, we find that marginal current-year net tax rates are very poor
proxies for the more appropriate lifetime measures.
We also find a far smaller impact on marginal net tax rates than expected arising
from the earnings test because either eliminating it or making workers cognizant of the
ARF leaves them with higher incomes and thus closer to Medicaid and other transfer-
payment thresholds. In other words, lessening the importance of one marginal net tax
can enhance the strength of others. On the other hand, eliminating all earnings and
asset tests of transfer programs leads to dramatically lower median marginal effective
remaining lifetime net tax rates for poor and lower-income households.
Marginal net tax rates levied on the elderly can vary enormously even within a
resource quintile for a given cohort. This is to be expected given that individual fiscal
policies have not been designed with their overall impacts on work incentives in mind,
but is quite at odds with the lessons of optimal tax theory.
A final key finding is that the current-year marginal net tax rates can dramatically
understate the work disincentives facing the elderly because they incorrectly assume
that all increments to earnings are spent in the same year they are earned.
We conclude by addressing the question posed in this paper’s title, “Is Uncle Sam
Inducing the Elderly to Retire?” Based on the work disincentives Uncle Sam imposes
on the elderly, the answer seems clearly to be yes. But an open question is the
extent to which the elderly correctly perceive these disincentives. Indeed, given the
complexity and interactions of our fiscal system and the heretofore reliance on current-
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year marginal net tax rates, it is hard to believe that policymakers, themselves, are
cognizant of the level and spread of the work disincentives they are imposing on the
elderly.
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Table 2.2: Distribution of Intended/Imputed Age of Retirement (Per-
cent of Cohort)
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94
Table 2.4: US Fiscal Systems and Subsystems Included in The Fiscal
Analyzer
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Table 2.7: Median Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates by
Cohort Resulting from a One-Year, $1,000 Increase in Current Earnings
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Table 2.10: Median Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates, Age
50–79 ($1,000, $10,000, and $20,000 Annual Increases in Earnings for
One Year and through Retirement)
Table 2.11: Median Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates,
Social Security Recipients, Ages 62–65 ($1,000, $10,000, and $20,000
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Table 2.12: Median Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates,
Social Security Recipients, Ages 62–65 ($1,000, $10,000, and $20,000
Increases in Earnings for One Year With and Without Earnings Test,
No ARF)
Table 2.13: Median Remaining Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates As-
suming No Earnings or Asset Testing of Transfer Payments, Ages 50–79,
$20,000 Increase in Earning for One Year
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Range, Cohort 50–79, Resulting from a One-Year, $20,000 Increase in
Current Earnings)
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Table 2.15: Maximum Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates Arising from
a $20,000 increase in Current-Year Earnings
Table 2.16: Minimum Lifetime Marginal Net Tax Rates Arising from
a $20,000 increase in Current-Year Earnings
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Figure 2·1: Decomposing lifetime resources, taxes, and transfer pay-
ments
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Figure 2·2: Median marginal lifetime net tax rates by percentile range,
ages 50–79, based on a $1,000 increase in earnings for one year
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Figure 2·3: Median marginal lifetime net tax rates by percentile range,
ages 50–79, arising from a $20,000 increase in earnings for one year
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Figure 2·4: Distribution of marginal remaining lifetime net tax rates,
ages 50–79, arising from a $20,000 increase in earnings for one year
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Chapter 3
House Price, Labor Productivity, and
Regional Migration in China
3.1 Introduction
This paper studies the impact of two different driving factors of regional migration in
China using a spatial equilibrium model with heterogeneous households. Migrants in
China have been a large group among the total population, stably at around 17.5%
(240 million) since 2010.1 It is important to research into the optimal labor allocation
and welfare implications caused by different migration reasons. Housing cost is one
important factor to take into account when migrating since housing consumption is a
large part (around 21%) of total consumption in China.2 Thus I incorporate housing
consumption into households’ utility and budget constraints.
I build a 2-period Overlapping Generations (OLG) model with two types of agents,
the high-skilled and the low-skilled, and two regions, rural or less developed region
and urban or more developed region. New-born households can freely choose where
to live. They only work when they are young. Young households consume goods and
housing and buy risk-free bonds. Old households sell housing and bonds to consume.
Each region has a representative firm that uses high-skilled labor, low-skilled labor,
and capital to produce. Government owns housing and rebate housing income from
the young to the old.
In this paper, I consider two interesting shocks to the economy. Figure 3·1 shows
1National Bureau of Statistics of China.
2National Bureau of Statistics of China.
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that the residential area in the urban region grows much faster than in the rural
region from the year 2002 to 2016. It is due to the urbanization process and city
expansion in China. Thus the first shock is to increase housing supply in the urban
region. When the urban region expands, both types of labor move into the urban
region. Skill ratio and housing price decrease in both regions. Both types of labor
gain higher utility.
Since wage income is the main source of wealth for households, I consider another
shock where the labor productivity of the high-skilled labor increases in the urban
region. It is from the observation that the urban region uses the high-skilled labor
more and more intensively. When firms in the urban region would like to use high-
skilled labor more intensively, the low-skilled has less comparative advantages in the
urban region and thus moves out. The high-skilled is less needed to produce the same
amount of output. Skill ratio increases in the urban region and decreases in the rural
region. Housing price decreases in the urban region since supply does not change and
demand decreases. The utility of high-skilled labor increases slowly and that of the
low-skilled decreases fast. In aggregate, the social welfare decreases.
Related Literature This paper is closely related to spatial equilibrium models
which could be traced back to Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982). Two recent works
incorporate heterogeneous workers with different skills based on the classical spatial
equilibrium model. Diamond (2016) estimated an empirical model with multiple
cities and two types of households with different skills. The focus of Diamond (2016)
is to find out the causes and welfare implications of the increased skill sorting in the
US. Giannone et al. (2017) added more features such as dynamic structure based on
Diamond (2016) and build the model with less micro aspects. Compared with those
two works, the model in this paper is simplified and only keeps the essential setup
of each sector. The purpose of the neat setup is to catch the change of key variables




The 2-period Overlapping Generations (OLG) economy has two types of agents: the
high-skilled and the low-skilled. There are two regions in this economy: a rural
or less developed region and an urban or more developed region. Time is discrete.
There is no aggregate or idiosyncratic uncertainty. I depict three sectors: households,
production, and the government.
Households
In each period, a new generation is born. For simplicity, I assume there is no pop-
ulation growth and the new generation has the same population N as the old one.
In each new generation, I assume that a fixed fraction SH of the population is high-
skilled, and the rest are low-skilled. Suppose the rural region has a share Sh1t of
the high-skilled among the two regions and Sl1t of the low-skilled among the two
regions at period t. Table 3.1 shows the share of high-skilled and low-skilled young
households in the two regions. I denote h1t as the share of high-skilled rural young
households among all young households. The other shares are denoted as l1t, h2t, and
l2t correspondingly.
Households solve the utility maximization problem in both regions and choose




i,t)) for i = rural region, urban
region.
Agents maximize the life-time utility when young in period t:
u(cyt , c
o




t+1 + σ2logzt (3.1)
where a is the utility from amenity, β is the discount factor, σ1 and σ2 are utility
parameters for amenity and housing correspondingly.
The first period represents the working period, from around 20 years old to 60
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years old. The second period represents the retired period, starting from 60 years
old. Before the first period, households choose a region, say j, delivering a higher
utility to live. In the first period, all households supply one unit of labor and earn
a wage income of wjt, given the corresponding skill type in region j. They are born
without endowment. They consume cyt with normalized price of 1, buy housing zt at
the price Pjt in region j, and buy bt unit of bond. In the second period, households
sell their housing at price Pj,t+1 and their bonds with gross return rate 1 + r
k
j,t+1 − δ,
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. Agents also receive social security soi,t+1
when old. All proceedings from selling assets and pensions are used to consume cot+1.
For notation purposes, I omit all subscripts for regions and superscripts for types in
the households’ problem. The budget constraint of households is given by
cyt + Ptzt + bt ≤ wt
cot+1 ≤ Pt+1zt + (1 + rkt+1 − δ)bt + sot+1
(3.2)
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In each region, a firm produces output Yt in period t with high-skilled labor Ht, low-
skilled labor Lt, and capital Kt using constant returns to scale (CRS) technology.
High-skilled and low-skilled labor are paid with wHt and wLt. Capital is hired at










where A is the total factor productivity, and γLi + γ
H
i + α = 1 for i = rural region,
urban region.
An important assumption about labor productivity is that the firm utilizes high-
skilled labor more intensively in the more developed region than in the less developed






























































The government supply housing. There is no rental market. Households can only
buy or sell housing as assets. Government rebates housing revenues to households as
social security expenditures when they become old. Government sets housing prices
such that the income of the government from selling housing in period t balance the
spending in period t.
P1tz1 + P2tz2 = s
o
t (3.7)
for i = rural region, urban region.
Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium is a tuple of variables {k1, k2, P1t, P2t, Sh1, Sl1} such that:
households and firms maximize their utility or profit, government has a balanced
sheet, and (i) the two capital stocks satisfy capital market clearing condition or goods
market clearing condition and free investment condition; (ii) the two housing prices
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satisfy the housing market clearing condition; (iii) the two population shares implied
by the two capital stocks and prices equalize the indirect utility of both high-skilled
and low-skilled labor in the two regions. Notice that any two of the conditions (i),
(ii), and (iii) imply the third one.
(i) Capital Market Clearing









(i) Goods Market Clearing
y1t + y2t + P1tz1 + P2tz2
− {(k1,t+1 + k2,t+1)− (1− δ)(k1t + k2t)}
= cHy1t h1t + c
Ho
1t h1,t−1 + c
Hy
2t h2t + c
Ho
2t h2,t−1
+ cLy1t lLt + c
Lo
1t l1,t−1 + c
Ly




















where zi ≡ Zi/N and Zi is housing supply in region i.
(iii) Spatial Equilibrium
V H1t = V
H
2t





Proposition 1. The steady-state return of capital does not depend on the supply of
housing or productivity of labor.
Proof. Suppose the economy is in steady state. By households’ optimal choice of
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consumption when young 3.3 and government’s budget constraint 3.7, we get
cy ≡cHy1 h1 + c
Ly
1 l1 + c
Hy




wHy1 h1 + w
Ly
1 l1 + w
Hy
2 h2 + w
Ly
2 l2
1 + β + σ2
+
so(h1 + l1 + h2 + l2)
(1 + rk − δ)(1 + β + σ2)
=
(1− α)(y1 + y2)
1 + β + σ2
+
P1z1 + P2z2
(1 + rk − δ)(1 + β + σ2)
(3.13)
Combining housing market clearing condition 3.11 and households’ optimal choice of
housing 3.3, we get
P1z1 + P2z2 = P1(z
H
1 h1 + z
L
1 l1) + P2(z
H









Combining 3.13 and 3.14, we get
cy =
1− α
1 + β + σ2 − σ2rk−δ
(y1 + y2) (3.15)
By goods market clearing condition 3.9
y1 + y2 + P1z1 + P2z2 = [1 + β(1 + r
k − δ)]cy




cy = [1 + β(1 + rk − δ)]cy






1 + β + σ2 − σ2rk−δ
(y1 + y2)





1 + β + σ2 − σ2rk−δ
= 1
⇔a(rk)2 + brk + c = 0 where a = β(1− α) > 0,
b = −α(1 + β)− (σ2 + βδ)(2− α) < 0,
c = σ2[1− (1− δ)(1− α)] + δ[α(1 + β) + σ2 + (1− α)βδ] > 0
(3.16)
Suppose α, β, σ2, δ are in reasonable value such that b
2 − 4ac > 0. This condition
can be easily achieved with commonly used value of those parameter. For example,
if we assume δ = 0, b2 − 4ac is always positive. Since a, b, and c do not depend on








2 , steady-state capital
return would not be impacted by the supply of housing or productivity of labor.
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Notice that in the proof, the steady-state capital return could have two positive
solutions. We cannot rule out any one of them because the system is so complicated.
In all of our simulation examples, the larger solution is the stable steady-state capital
return.
3.2.3 Calibration
The above model with 6 state variables is relatively complicated to solve, so we only
have limited results for analytical solutions. It is more straightforward to simulate the
economy. For illustrative purposes, the benchmark case calibration is applied with
commonly used life-cycle parameters. β = 0.9940 ≈ 0.67, α = 0.3. In 2015, about 18%
of employed households in China have college or above degree.3 Thus I set SH = 0.18.
I normalize amenity in rural region to be one and assume amenity in urban region
is higher, thus a1 = 1, a2 = 2. Households get much smaller utility from amenity
than consumption, σ1 = 0.1. In 2015, Chinese households housing expenditure is
about 20% of total spending.4 By Pz = 0.2(Pz + cy + co) and households FOC,
σ2 = 0.55. Total factor productivity in the urban region is set such that the wage
income of low-skilled labor is not too small, A1 = 10.
5 Since low-skilled labor in the
rural region earns about half of the low-skilled in the urban region, I set A2 = 28.
6 To
estimate the labor productivity in the two regions, I use a formula induced from the
first-order conditions of firms γH/γL = ΣwHi /Σw
L
j . I first find out the high-skilled
labor proportion in each region.7 Then I look at the average disposable income of
rural and urban households who are divided into five quantiles by their disposable
income.8 Then I assume the income is flat within each quantile group and calculate
the wage income of the high-skilled and low-skilled in each region. The actual high-
skilled labor productivity in each region should be higher. γH2 = 0.33, γ
H
1 = 0.15,
3China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook 2016, 3-1
4National Bureau of Statistics of China
5Or consumption could be smaller than one and utility might be negative.
6China Labour Statistical Yearbook, China Statistical Yearbook.
7China Labour Statistical Yearbook.
8China Statistical Yearbook.
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γL2 = 0.37, γ
L
1 = 0.55. Rural region housing supply is normalized to be one, z1 = 1.
According to National Bureau of Statistics of China9, in 2012, urban residential area
is 2.34× 1016 m2 and rural residential area is 2.38× 1016 m2. Thus z2 = 0.98.
3.2.4 Steady State
Benchmark
The above benchmark economy has one stable steady state with Sh1 = 0.0299,
Sl1 = 0.1033, k1 = 0.0482, k2 = 1.6811, P1 = 0.1423, P2 = 3.8544. The majority
of high-skilled and low-skilled labor are both in the urban region. It indicates that
if there is no migration costs or other obstacles, China’s urbanization process should
have been more complete. The total consumption and production as well as capital
are higher in the urban region because 91% of the total population are in the urban
region. Housing price in the urban region is higher. Wage of the high-skilled is
higher in both regions. Indirect utility of high-skilled labor is about two times that
of low-skilled labor. rk = 2.9423, thus annual return of capital is around 2.7%.
Comparative Statistics
Urban land as well as housing in China has been expanding with urbanization. At
the same time, industrial structure in China is upgrading and many firms in the
urban region use high-skilled labor more intensively. I consider two experiments:
increasing the housing supply in the urban region and increasing the high-skilled
labor productivity in the urban region. Figure 3·2 -3·4 plot the comparative statistics
of the first experiment. Figure 3·5 -3·7 plot the comparative statistics of the second
experiment.















As housing supply in the urban region increases, both high-skilled and low-skilled
labor increase in the urban region and decrease in the rural region. Suppose the
economy is in the benchmark steady state, thus the indirect utility of living in the
rural region and the urban region equals for both types of labor. Now the housing
supply in the urban region increases, if no one moves, then both types of households
in the urban region would have a higher utility. Thus, both high-skilled and low-
skilled labor move into the urban region from the rural region to reach the spatial
equilibrium.
I define the skill ratio to be the number of high-skilled labor ratio the number of
low-skilled labor. When the housing supply changes in the economy, there are two
extreme cases. First, when housing supply in the urban region is zero, everyone lives
in the rural region, thus the skill ratio in the rural region is SH/(1 − SH). When
the urban region housing supply increases, both high-skilled and low-skilled labor in
the rural region decrease. The high-skilled labor productivity in the urban region is
higher, thus they can potentially benefit more in the urban region. Consequently, the
percentage change of high-skilled labor is larger than that of the low-skilled. The skill
ratio in the rural region decreases as housing supply in the urban region increases.
Second, when housing supply in the urban region is infinity, everyone lives in the
urban region, thus the skill ratio in the urban region is SH/(1− SH). When housing
supply in the urban region decreases, the low-skilled can benefit more than the high-
skilled by moving to the rural region because their labor productivity in the rural
region is higher than in the urban region. The percentage change of low-skilled labor
is larger than the high-skilled. Thus the skill ratio in the urban region increases as
urban housing supply decreases. Or, the skill ratio in the urban region decreases as
housing supply in the urban region increases.














When high-skilled labor productivity in the urban region increases, fewer high-
skilled and low-skilled labor would live in the urban region. The reason is that fewer
people are needed to produce the same amount of outputs. Low-skilled labor decreases
faster because the comparative advantage to live in the rural area becomes higher as
γH2 increases. As a result, in the urban region, both types of labor has to decrease
and the skill ratio increases. For the rural region, since the low-skilled increases fast,
the skill ratio decreases.







Since both high-skilled and low-skilled labor increase in the urban region and
decrease in the rural region, the capital has to increase in the urban region and
decrease in the rural region, such that the capital returns in the two regions are
equivalent.






< 0 for γH2 < 0.66,
dk2
dγH2
> 0 for γH2 > 0.67, (3.20)
Since the total population in the rural region increases, the capital increases. As
long as high-skilled labor productivity in the urban region is not too large, the capital
would decrease as the population decreases.







Housing price in both regions decreases. Compared with the benchmark steady
state, when housing supply in the urban region increase, the housing price in the
urban region would decrease immediately if no one moves. When people start to
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move out of the rural region, the housing price in the rural region also decreases. The
housing price in the urban region would increase, but not higher than the benchmark.
Otherwise the utility of living in the urban region would be lower than the rural region
and the spatial equilibrium would not hold. In a word, the total housing supply in
the economy increases and the total population in the economy does not change. As a
result, both regions share the welfare gain by free migration between the two regions.







The comparative statistics of housing price is intuitive. Since the housing sup-
ply does not change and only the population changes, housing price changes in the
opposite direction as the population.



































Wage of high-skilled labor increases in both regions and wage of low-skilled labor
decreases in both regions. Since the skill ratio in both regions decreases, the low-
skilled labor increases faster in the urban region and decreases slower in the rural
region. For high-skilled labor in the urban region, ∆wH2 = γ
L
2 ∆l2+α∆k2−γH2 ∆h2 > 0
because the change of low-skilled labor in the urban region is larger than the high-
skilled labor and dominates the change of wage. Similarly, the wage of high-skilled
labor increases in the rural region and the wage of low-skilled labor in both regions
decreases.
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Individual housing consumption increases for both types of agents in both regions.
This is intuitive since total housing supply increases in the economy and new-born
households can freely choose where to live. Because rural population decreases, hous-
ing consumption increases per rural capita. Although urban population increases,
housing consumption still increases for both types of labor because the supply in-
creases.
Individual consumption is increasing in wage income and pensions. Pensions are
the same for everyone, equaling the total market value of housing P1z1 + P2z2 in the
two regions. The total market value of housing increases because the housing supply
increases. Thus high-skilled labor increases their goods consumption. Over 90% of
households lifetime wealth is wage income for both types of labor in both regions.
Thus individual consumption mostly depends on the wage. Low-skilled labor de-
creases their goods consumption. Aggregate consumption of high-skilled labor in the
urban region increases because both individual consumption and population increase.
Aggregate consumption of low-skilled labor in the urban region also increases because
the low-skilled labor in the urban region increases fast. Aggregate consumption in the
rural region decreases because total population decreases. Aggregate consumption in
the economy increases.
Since all three factors increase in the urban region and decrease in the rural
region, the production increases in the urban region and decreases in the rural region.
Aggregate production increases.
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> 0 for γH2 > 0.65
(3.24)
We know that ∆wH = γL∆l+α∆k−γH∆h, ∆wL = γH∆h+α∆k−γL∆l. For the
rural region, since the low-skilled labor increases more than the high-skilled, the wage
of the low-skilled decreases and the wage of the high-skilled increases. For the urban
region, not only the population but also γH2 changes. The change in the individual
consumption of land is intuitive, since the supply does not change in each region and
only the demand changes. Total market value of housing decreases since the price
in the urban region decreases fast. Comparative statics of the consumption is again
consistent with the wage, since the wage is the most important part of the wealth.
Production in each region changes in the same direction as the capital.











The indirect utility depends on the goods consumption and the housing consump-
tion. Given the conditions of the spatial equilibrium, we only need to check the utility
of households in one region, say, the urban region. For high-skilled labor, goods con-
sumption in both periods and the housing consumption all increase, thus the indirect
utility increases as well. For low-skilled labor, goods consumption in both periods de-
crease, but the housing consumption increases. Since the wage of low-skilled decreases
much slower than the increase of their housing consumption, the indirect utility of
the low-skilled also increases. The social welfare W = SHV H +(1−SH)V L increases.










Again, we can only focus on the utility of households in the urban region. For
the high-skilled labor, the housing consumption increases. The goods consumption
first increases, then decreases, and finally increases. As a result, the indirect utility
of the high-skilled increases slowly. For the low-skilled, both goods consumption and
housing consumption decrease. So the indirect utility of the low-skilled decreases a
lot. The social welfare decreases since low-skilled labor is the majority.
3.3 Conclusion
In this paper, I separately check the impact of city expansion and industrial upgrade
to different groups of people in China. Specifically, I build a spatial equilibrium model
with two types of agents who have different skill levels. By looking at the impact of
increasing the housing supply and high-skilled labor productivity in the urban region,
I study the direction of labor migration and its welfare implications. When the urban
region expands, both types of labor move into the urban region, and the capital also
increases in the urban region. The rural region has opposite comparative statistics
for population and capital. In both regions, the housing price decreases. Both types
of labor have higher utility. When firms in the urban region would like to use high-
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skilled labor more intensively, both high-skilled and low-skilled are crowed out, and
the capital in the urban region also decreases. Housing price decreases in the urban
region since the supply does not change and the demand decreases. The rural region
has opposite comparative statistics for the above quantities or prices. The utility
of high-skilled labor increases and that of the low-skilled decreases. In aggregate,
the social welfare decreases. The model shows that the city expansion is good for
everyone in the economy while the industrial upgrade only benefits the high-skilled
labor.
The next step for this paper could be empirically checking which one of the two
reasons is leading the migration process in China. I could use implications of com-
parative statistics of different variables to form the identification strategy.
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Table 3.1: Share of Different Types of Young Households in Region j
at Period t
Rural Region Urban Region
High-skilled labor h1t = S
HSh1t h2t = S
H(1− Sh1t)
Low-skilled labor l1t = (1− SH)Sl1t l2t = (1− SH)(1− Sl1t)
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Figure 3·1: Residential Building Area in Urban and Rural China
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Figure 3·2: Comparative Statistics by increasing housing supply in
urban region from 0.8 to 10
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Figure 3·3: Comparative Statistics by increasing housing supply in
urban region from 0.8 to 10
125
Figure 3·4: Comparative Statistics by increasing housing supply in
urban region from 0.8 to 10
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Figure 3·5: Comparative Statistics by increasing high-skilled labor
productivity in urban region from 0.33 to 0.69
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Figure 3·6: Comparative Statistics by increasing high-skilled labor
productivity in urban region from 0.33 to 0.69
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Figure 3·7: Comparative Statistics by increasing high-skilled labor
productivity in urban region from 0.33 to 0.69
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Appendix A
Additional Graphs and Tables
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Table A.1: First Stage with One-side bad luck and Assets-weighted luck
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Luck 0.0414*** 0.0614*** 0.0766*** 0.0967*** 0.114*** 0.117***
(4.166) (5.834) (6.818) (8.075) (8.848) (8.219)
Observations 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105
R-squared 0.389 0.394 0.397 0.402 0.406 0.403
IV F-stat 17.36 34.03 46.48 65.20 78.29 67.55
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.2: Second Stage with One-side bad luck and Assets-weighted luck
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
log(R) -0.0511*** -0.0563*** -0.0516*** -0.0529*** -0.0565*** -0.0540***
(0.0197) (0.0144) (0.0121) (0.0103) (0.00958) (0.0102)
Observations 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105
R-squared 0.096 0.062 0.094 0.085 0.061 0.078
Durbin pval 0.251 0.0462 0.0553 0.0160 0.00237 0.0102
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.3: First Stage with Two-sided luck and Unweighted luck
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Luck 0.0379*** 0.0438*** 0.0520*** 0.0649*** 0.0692*** 0.0640***
(6.396) (6.807) (7.401) (8.499) (8.360) (7.051)
Observations 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105
R-squared 0.396 0.397 0.399 0.404 0.404 0.398
IV F-stat 40.91 46.34 54.77 72.24 69.89 49.71
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.4: Second Stage with Two-sided luck and Unweighted luck
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
log(R) -0.0526*** -0.0569*** -0.0537*** -0.0523*** -0.0553*** -0.0500***
(0.0129) (0.0124) (0.0113) (0.00981) (0.0101) (0.0117)
Observations 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105
R-squared 0.087 0.058 0.080 0.089 0.069 0.102
Durbin pval 0.0601 0.0176 0.0226 0.0134 0.00602 0.0652
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.5: First Stage with One-side bad luck and Unweighted luck
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Luck 0.0495*** 0.0631*** 0.0748*** 0.0903*** 0.101*** 0.0990***
(5.875) (7.450) (8.479) (9.697) (10.11) (8.978)
Observations 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105
R-squared 0.394 0.400 0.404 0.410 0.412 0.407
IV F-stat 34.52 55.50 71.89 94.03 102.1 80.60
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.6: Second Stage with One-side bad luck and Unweighted luck
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
log(R) -0.0481*** -0.0524*** -0.0495*** -0.0503*** -0.0535*** -0.0477***
(0.0139) (0.0111) (0.00974) (0.00858) (0.00834) (0.00917)
Observations 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105
R-squared 0.113 0.088 0.105 0.101 0.082 0.115
Durbin pval 0.163 0.0298 0.0309 0.0103 0.00204 0.0378
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure A·1: MPC out of Net Lifetime Resources by Quintiles
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